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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of 
selected state and federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither 
comprehensive in breadth, as several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues 
within individual cases are omitted. Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an 
authoritative guide; rather, they are intended to alert the Alaska legal community to 
judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries are grouped by subject matter. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Anchorage Board of Adjustment v. LBJ 
In Anchorage Board of Adjustment v LBJ,1 the supreme court held that a road near 
a school qualifies as an urban improvement area and therefore must meet urban collector 
standards.2 In 2005, the Platting Board determined that a section of road adjacent to a 
new school would have to be improved to meet standards similar to urban collector 
standards.3 The Board of Adjustment reversed the Platting Board’s determination and 
found that it was not supported by substantial evidence.4 The superior court reversed the 
decision of the Board of Adjustment and reinstated the determination of the Platting 
Board.5 The superior court reasoned that the only way to read the administrative record 
was to conclude that the section of road was in an urban improvement area and to require 
by operation of law that the road be improved to meet urban collector standards.6 The 
superior court also found that the school board had supplied no reasonable basis to defend 
                                                 
1 228 P.3d 87 (Alaska 2010). 
2 Id. at 87.  Citations to pages 88–93 are to the superior court’s decision, which was attached as an 
appendix. Id. 
3 Id. at 88.  By requiring a road to meet “urban collector standards,” the Board was requiring curbs, gutters, 
lighting, paved shoulders, and a multi-use path. Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 87. 
6 Id. at 90, 92. 
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the Board of Adjustment’s decision.7 Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed, holding 
that a road near a school qualifies as an urban improvement area and therefore must meet 
urban collector standards.8 
 
Doubleday v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission 
 In Doubleday v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,9 the supreme 
court held: (1) a fisherman cannot use the spoliation of evidence doctrine to shift the 
burden of proof when he is unable to make a showing that records were lost due to the 
fault of the state, and (2) he is required to exhaust his administrative remedies to 
challenge the number of fishery permits issued by the Commercial Fisheries Entry 
Commission (Commission) and could not be excused on grounds of futility.10 
Doubleday’s applications for permits for two fisheries were denied by the Commission 
because he failed to produce sufficient evidence of participation in either fishery.11 
Doubleday argued that he could not meet the burden of proof because the state destroyed 
or lost records necessary to prove his case, and therefore the spoliation of evidence 
doctrine supplied a rebuttable presumption that the missing documents would have 
established facts unfavorable to the Commission.12 The supreme court held that even if 
the spoliation of evidence doctrine could apply to this type of case, Doubleday failed to 
produce any evidence in support of the claim that the government destroyed records 
negligently or intentionally.13 Doubleday’s claim that the Commission violated the 
Limited Entry Act by incorrectly calculating the maximum number of fishery permits 
was denied because Doubleday did not exhaust his administrative remedies.14 Affirming 
the superior court, the supreme court held that: (1) a fisherman cannot use the spoliation 
of evidence doctrine to shift the burden of proof when he is unable to make a showing 
that records were lost due to the fault of the state, and (2) he is required to exhaust his 
administrative remedies to challenge the number of fishery permits issued by the 
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission.15 
 
Gottstein v. State, Department of Natural Resources 
 In Gottstein v. State, Department of Natural Resources,16 the supreme court held 
that the department does not necessarily violate the due process rights of interest holders 
in an oil and gas lease by refusing to hold a hearing before deciding an appeal of the 
approval of a proposed plan of development.17  Interest holders in a Cook Inlet oil and 
gas lease appealed three final agency decisions pertaining to their lease.18 The superior 
court affirmed the agency decisions,19 and the interest holders appealed.20  In considering 
                                                 
7 Id. at 92. 
8 Id. at 87. 
9 238 P.3d 100 (Alaska 2010). 
10 Id. at 106–09. 
11 Id. at 101. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 106–07. 
14 Id. at 107–11. 
15 Id. at 106–09. 
16 223 P.3d 609 (Alaska 2010). 
17 Id. at 620–27. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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whether the due process rights of the interest holders were violated, the court noted the 
Commissioner’s conclusion that all information consulted and relied upon was available 
on the public record and that the interest holders did not subsequently object to this 
conclusion or give notice of any specific disputed material facts.21  Affirming the superior 
court’s decision, the supreme court held that a department does not necessarily violate the 
due process rights of interest holders in an oil and gas lease by refusing to hold a hearing 
before deciding an appeal of the approval of a proposed plan of development, and the 
superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for trial de novo.22   
 
Hymes v. Deramus 
 In Hymes v. Deramus,23 the supreme court held that a prison inmate is not 
required to exhaust administrative remedies for a medical malpractice claim based on an 
irreparable harm that cannot be corrected by the agency.24  Hymes was a federal prisoner 
who was temporarily held at a state facility.25 He brought suit against the physician and 
physician’s assistant at that facility, alleging several instances of medical malpractice that 
caused him irreparable harm.26 The superior court granted the physician’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that Hymes had not exhausted administrative remedies 
before bringing suit.27 The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that one of 
Hymes’s claims was not subject to the exhaustion requirement.28 Hymes was allegedly 
prescribed a medication that caused him irreparable harm, and the supreme court 
reasoned that the policy objectives of an exhaustion requirement are not advanced when 
the error is completely in the past and the agency has no way of correcting it.29 Reversing 
the lower court, the supreme court held that a prison inmate is not required to exhaust 
administrative remedies for a medical malpractice claim based on an irreparable harm 
that cannot be corrected by the agency.30  
Kingik v. State, Department of Administration 
In Kingik v. State, Department of Administration,31 the supreme court held that 
determining whether there has been a procedural due process violation requires 
considering the government’s interest, the private individual’s interest, and the risk that 
the private individual will be erroneously deprived of her interest.32 Kingik’s husband 
submitted an Application for Retirement Benefits to the Division of Retirement and 
Benefits (Division).33 Kingik provided a notarized signature on the application 
consenting to her husband’s choice of a retirement option that did not include spousal 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 621. 
22 Id. at 620–27. 
23 222 P.3d 874 (Alaska 2010). 
24 Id. at 882–83. 
25 Id. at 878. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 880. 
28 Id. at 882–83. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 239 P.3d 1243 (Alaska 2010).  
32 Id. at 1248. 
33 Id. at 1246. 
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benefits after his death.34 After Kingik’s husband died, the Division discontinued benefits 
to Kingik.35 The superior court upheld the Division’s denial of benefits.36 Kingik 
appealed, arguing the Division violated her due process rights by failing to safeguard her 
right to survivor benefits.37 The supreme court held that because the application’s plain 
language was reasonably clear, an erroneous deprivation of survivor benefits was 
unlikely; consequently, Kingik’s due process rights were not violated.38 The court further 
held that Kingik’s waiver of survivor benefits was effective.39 Affirming the lower court, 
the supreme court held that determining whether there has been a procedural due process 
violation requires considering the government’s interest, the private individual’s interest, 
and the risk that the private individual will be erroneously deprived of her interest.40 
 
Nash v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough  
In Nash v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough,41 the supreme court held that an 
individual’s due process rights are violated when an agency, during an administrative 
hearing, bars that individual from presenting witnesses and relevant, material evidence 
that is essential for a fair trial.42 Nash entered a timber contract with the Matanuska-
Susitna Borough (Mat-Su) on September 25, 1998, which they amended twelve times.43 
On October 25, 2002, Mat-Su notified Nash that due to breach, his contract was 
terminated.44 Nash appealed his contract termination with the local board of adjustment 
and appeals.45  Nash inquired about bringing witnesses to support his appeal and was 
informed that interested parties could testify, but only if they had testified previously.46 
Because this was not an appeal from a previous hearing, Nash moved to have parties 
speak on his behalf and sent the board a list of individuals for approval.47 He received no 
response from the board and thus did not ask most of his witnesses to take time off to 
attend the hearing.48 The board upheld Mat-Su’s termination of Nash’s contract, and 
Nash sued Mat-Su in superior court inter alia for breach of contract.49 Nash argued that 
his trial should be de novo because the board hearing was unfair and violated his due 
process rights.50 The superior court, finding no due process violation, affirmed the 
administrative agency’s decision.51 Nash appealed, and the supreme court found that 
although due process in administrative hearings is not identical to court proceedings, it 
                                                 
34 Id. at 1246–47. 
35 Id. at 1247. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 1249. 
39 Id. at 1246. 
40 Id. at 1248. 
41 239 P.3d 692 (Alaska 2010). 
42 Id. at 701.    
43 Id. at 693–94.  
44 Id. at 695.  
45 Id. at 696. 
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 697. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
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should still be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial.52 Reversing the superior court 
and remanding for a trial de novo, the supreme court held that an individual’s due process 
rights are violated when an agency, during an administrative hearing, bars that individual 
from presenting witnesses and relevant, material evidence that is essential for a fair 
trial.53 
 
Pietro v. UNOCAL 
 In Pietro v. UNOCAL,54 the supreme court held that a Workers’ Compensation 
Board must: (1) evaluate lay testimony and consider significant issues in order to 
determine whether an employee has proven claims by a preponderance of the evidence; 
and (2) must provide detailed reasons for its decisions.55  After working at a UNOCAL 
plant where he was exposed to arsenic, Pietro developed peripheral neuropathy and 
eventually skin cancer.56  Pietro asked for workers’ compensation benefits, which the 
Workers’ Compensation Board denied after finding UNOCAL had presented sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption of compensability.57  Pietro appealed the decision and 
the supreme court found that UNOCAL presented sufficient evidence to rebut the 
presumption of compensability and thus the Board did not err.58  However, the Board was 
required to then weigh testimony to determine whether Pietro had proven his claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence, which the court found the Board had failed to do.59  The 
court also found the Board’s conclusory statement did not provide enough information to 
assess its accuracy, as the Board did not give reasons to reject Pietro’s experts’ testimony 
and placed too much reliance on a 24-hour urine test.60  Affirming in part and vacating in 
part, the supreme court held that a Workers’ Compensation Board must: (1) evaluate lay 
testimony and consider significant issues in order to determine whether an employee has 
proven  claims by a preponderance of the evidence; and (2) must provide detailed reasons 
for its decisions.61 
 
Smart v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Smart v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,62 the supreme court 
held that: (1) the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) must give adequate 
notice of audit decisions and appeal periods; and (2) a DHHS promulgated audit protocol 
was not a regulation under Alaska’s Administrative Policy Act (APA).63 DHSS audited 
Smart, a care coordinator, for Medicaid overpayments.64 In June 2007, DHHS sent Smart 
a final audit report indicating  total DHHS payments during the audit; the letter failed to 
                                                 
52 Id. at 699. 
53 Id. at 701.    
54 233 P.3d 604 (Alaska 2010). 
55 Id. at 613–617 . 
56 Id. at 607–610.  
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 611–12. 
59 Id. at 612. 
60 Id. at 615. 
61 Id. at 613–617 . 
62237 P.3d 1010 (Alaska 2010). 
63Id. at 1016, 1018. 
64Id. at 1013. 
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specify an overpayment and recoupment amount and Smart did not appeal.65 
Subsequently, in August 2007, DHSS issued a notice of recoupment for $2,370 and 
provided no opportunity for appeal.66 Smart filed a putative class action complaint 
alleging that DHHS’s failure to promulgate its audit protocol violated the APA and that 
DHHS violated due process by failing to provide an opportunity to appeal notices of 
recoupment issued without support for the recoupment determination.67 The superior 
court granted DHSS’s motion to dismiss, finding that Smart failed to file a timely appeal 
with DHHS and thus failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.68 Smart appealed the 
decision and the supreme court found that DHSS’s notice to Smart did not comply with 
due process because the recoupment amount and the appeal period should have been 
clearly stated in the same letter as a description of DHHS’s specific findings.69 
Additionally, the supreme court found that the protocol DHSS used for the audit process 
was not a regulation under the APA because it was a “statistically valid sampling 
methodolog[y].”70  Reversing and remanding in part and affirming in part, the supreme 
court found that: (1) the DHSS must give adequate notice of audit decisions and appeal 
periods; and (2) a DHHS promulgated audit protocol was not a regulation under the 
APA.71 
 
Yost v. State of Alaska, Dep’t of Commerce 
In Yost v. State of Alaska, Department of Commerce,72 the supreme court held that 
a doctor’s civil action regarding her license application was properly treated as an 
administrative appeal.73 Dr. Yost made a good faith answer to a licensing examination 
question that actually proved to be misleading.74 During the course of the ensuing 
litigation, the superior court converted her civil action to an administrative appeal.75 Dr. 
Yost argued that the case was fundamentally about her contract and not properly 
characterized as an administrative appeal.76 Because the case required the court “to 
consider the propriety of an agency determination”,77 the supreme court held that the 
action was properly treated as an administrative appeal, irrespective of the framing of Dr. 
Yost’s argument in contract terms.78  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
65Id. at 1012–13. 
66Id. at 1015–16. 
67Id. at 1013–14. 
68Id. 
69Id. at 1016. 
70Id. at 1018. 
71Id. at 1016, 1018. 
72 234 P.3d 1264 (Alaska 2010). 
73 Id. at 1272. 
74 Id. at 1267. 
75 Id. at 1273. 
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 1273–74. 
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BUSINESS LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
Holmes v. Wolf 
In Holmes v. Wolf,79 the supreme court held that when a court finds that a 
corporation’s directors have breached their fiduciary duty, the shareholders are not 
automatically entitled to an award of nominal damages.80 Holmes, a shareholder of 
Lesnoi, Inc., joined as a plaintiff in a derivative shareholder lawsuit against three of 
Lesnoi’s five directors.81 Holmes claimed, inter alia, that the directors had failed to 
obtain and send out audited financial reports.82 The superior court concluded that the 
directors had breached their fiduciary duty by failing to inform themselves about the 
federal audit requirement.83 On appeal, Holmes argued that the superior court erred in not 
awarding nominal damages after finding the directors had breached their fiduciary duty.84 
Because the superior court found that the directors acted in good faith and in the interest 
of Lesnoi, the supreme court held that failing to award nominal damages was not an 
abuse of discretion.85 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that when a court 
finds that a corporation’s directors have breached their fiduciary duty, the shareholders 
are not automatically entitled to an award of nominal damages.86 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
top  
 
United States District Court for the District of Alaska 
 
Dietzmann v. United States 
In Dietzmann v. United States,87 a magistrate judge held that the U.S. Department 
of Justice (DOJ) is not relieved from compliance with a previous order that required 
representatives from both parties be present at a settlement conference.88 The judge 
previously ordered that every party have a representative, with full authority to settle 
claims, present at the settlement conference.89 Ten days before the conference, DOJ 
stated that it would not have anyone in attendance with full authority to settle because 
only high-ranking officials had that authority and requiring a high-ranking official to 
attend would create a hardship.90 The court noted that DOJ had notice of the settlement 
                                                 
79 243 P.3d 584 (Alaska 2010).  
80 Id. at 590. 
81 Id. at 586. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 589. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 590. 
86 Id.  
87 No. 3:09-CV-0019-RJB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133445 (D. Alaska Dec. 3, 2010). 
88 Id. at *18. 
89 Id. at *6–7. 
90 Id. at *8–10. 
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conference.91 The court also noted that DOJ only cited its own regulations—not a 
statute—for the proposition that only high-ranking officials have the authority to settle 
large cases.92 The court concluded that it has the power to review DOJ’s regulations and 
to require that someone with full authority to settle claims be present at a settlement 
conference.93 Thus, the magistrate judge held that DOJ is not relieved from compliance 
with a previous order that required representatives from both parties be present at a 
settlement conference.94    
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Anderson v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. 
In Anderson v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,95 the supreme court held that the 
operator of a pipeline pump station was a “project owner” under the exclusive liability 
provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act and was therefore immune from suit, but 
that an offer of judgment in the amount of ten dollars was a nominal offer and did not 
trigger the application of Alaska Civil Rule 68.96 Anderson was injured at work, received 
workers’ compensation benefits, and filed a negligence action against Alyeska Pipeline 
Service (Alyeska) under the theory that Alyeska was not a statutory employer and should 
not be immune from suit under the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act.97 Alyeska 
responded, highlighting 2004 changes to the exclusive liability provisions of Alaska’s 
Workers’ Compensation Act that showed a strong likelihood that Alyeska would be 
considered a “project owner.”98 Alyeska then made an offer of judgment for ten dollars, 
which Anderson rejected.99 When the superior court dismissed Anderson’s claim, 
Alyeska was granted attorneys’ fees.100 Anderson appealed the summary judgment and 
the award of attorneys’ fees.101  The court found, based on the legislative history of the 
2004 changes and the statutory definition of “project owner,” that Alyeska clearly met the 
definition of “project owner” and was covered by the exclusive liability provisions of AS 
23.30.055 and that the superior court was correct in granting summary judgment for 
Alyeska.102 However, the court acknowledged, and left open, the “difficult hypothetical 
examples” raised by Anderson about the potential for small businesses to abuse the 
exclusive liability provisions through the use of contractors.103  Finally, the court held 
that a ten-dollar offer, made at the outset of a case that presented a novel legal question, 
did not serve the purpose of Rule 68 to encourage settlement and should be considered 
nominal.104 The supreme court affirmed the superior court decision that the operator of a 
                                                 
91 Id. at *10–11. 
92 Id. at *15–17. 
93 Id. at *14–17. 
94 Id. at *18. 
95 234 P.3d 1282 (Alaska 2010). 
96 Id. at 1288, 1289–90. 
97 Id. at 1284. 
98 Id. at 1285. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1285–86. 
101 Id. at 1286. 
102 Id. at 1288. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1289. 
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pipeline pump station was a “project owner” under the exclusive liability provision of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act and was therefore immune from suit but reversed and 
remanded the lower court’s Rule 68 attorney’s fee award, holding that an offer of 
judgment in the amount of ten dollars was a nominal offer and did not trigger the 
application of Rule 68.105 
 
Angleton v. Cox 
 In Angleton v. Cox,106 the supreme court held that members of a nonprofit 
organization did not have the right to bring a derivative action.107  Following suspension 
of several members of various lodges, members of a fraternal organization brought suit 
against other members asserting claims for breach of settlement agreement and a 
derivative action on behalf of the organization.108  The superior court dismissed the 
derivative suit.109  On appeal, the supreme court held the derivative action was 
appropriately dismissed because Alaska law does not recognize a derivative right of 
action for members of nonprofit organizations.110  Affirming the dismissal of the 
derivative action, the supreme court held that members of a nonprofit organization did 
not have the right to bring a derivative action.111 
 
Armstrong v. Tanaka 
 In Armstrong v. Tanaka,112 the supreme court held that a balancing test is required 
to weigh the parties’ interests and to determine whether stay is appropriate when an 
individual facing criminal charges brings a civil action and either party requests a stay of 
civil proceedings pending resolution of criminal charges.113 Tanaka reported Armstrong 
to the police after Armstrong gave Tanaka’s son an explicitly sexual and violent book.114 
The police obtained a warrant to search Armstrong’s home and workplace and eventually 
charged Armstrong with several counts of felony possession and distribution of child 
pornography.115 After criminal charges were filed, Armstrong initiated a defamation suit 
against Tanaka.116 Armstrong refused to answer several deposition questions on the basis 
that they violated his right against self incrimination and he moved to stay civil 
proceedings pending the resolution of criminal charges.117 The superior court dismissed 
the civil suit and awarded Tanaka attorneys’ fees.118 The supreme court held that 
applying a balancing test best safeguards a criminal defendant’s right against self-
incrimination and right to due process while maintaining a civil defendant’s right to 
                                                 
105 Id. at 1288, 1289–90. 
106  238 P.3d 610 (Alaska 2010). 
107 Id. at 614–618. 
108 Id. at 611–612. 
109 Id. at 611. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 614–618. 
112 228 P.3d 79 (Alaska 2010). 
113 Id. at 85. 
114 Id. at 81. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 82. 
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defend himself.119 The court remanded the case and held that a balancing test is required 
to weigh the parties’ interests and to determine whether stay is appropriate when an 
individual facing criminal charges brings a civil action and either party requests a stay of 
civil proceedings pending resolution of criminal charges.120 
 
Berg v. Vandervest 
In Berg v. Vandervest,121 the supreme court held that when a pro se litigant makes 
a clear effort to comply with court procedure, the court has an obligation to inform him of 
the procedural steps necessary to achieve his obvious objective.122 Due to a mistake in 
Berg’s preparation of his 2007 taxes, the Child Support Services Division (“CSSD”) 
complied with his request to submit a motion to modify his child support payments.123  
Berg submitted a memorandum and affidavit in support of the motion, as well as a 
motion to vacate his 2006 child support order.124 However, after receiving additional 
information from Berg’s ex-wife, the CSSD withdrew its motion,125 and the superior 
court took no further action on his memorandum and affidavit.126 The court considered 
Berg’s motion to vacate as a relief from judgment.127 However, the court denied his 
motion due to untimeliness.128 After the CSSD withdrew its motion, Berg had no vehicle 
to achieve the payment modification himself.129 Since his submitted materials made it 
clear that his goal was to modify his payments,130 and he was operating in good faith,131 
the supreme court determined that the superior court should have either interpreted 
Berg’s accompanying memorandum and affidavit in a way that would have survived the 
withdrawal of the CSSD motion or provided him information about how to file his own 
motion.132 Remanding, the supreme court held that when a pro se litigant makes a clear 
effort to comply with court procedure, the court has an obligation to inform him of the 
procedural steps necessary to achieve his obvious objective.133 
 
Bolden v. State, Department of Corrections 
In Bolden v. State,134 the supreme court held that because it was unclear whether a 
prisoner’s claim was an administrative appeal or a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, the superior court erred in dismissing the claim without notice or an opportunity to 
clarify the nature of the claim.135 Bolden, a prisoner at the Fairbanks Correctional Center 
                                                 
119 Id. at 85. 
120 Id.  
121 No. S-13136, No. 1364, 2010 Alas. LEXIS 60 (Alaska Jun. 23, 2010).  
122 Id. at *11. 
123 Id. at *4–5. 
124 Id. at *6–7. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at *7-8. 
127 Id. at *8. 
128 Id. at *8.  
129 Id. at *11. 
130 Id. at *12. 
131 Id. at *14. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. at *11. 
134 No. S-12925, 2010 Alas. LEXIS 75 (Alaska Jul. 14, 2010). 
135 Id. at *14. 
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(“FCC”), filed a grievance against the FCC asserting that his Eighth Amendment rights 
had been violated when his toilet overflowed, ruining the cast on his injured leg, and he 
was forced to remain in his cell overnight without getting a new cast.136 Bolden’s 
grievance was denied by the FCC, as was his subsequent appeal to the Director of 
Institutions.137  He filed a pro se claim with the superior court, which, sua sponte, 
interpreted Bolden’s claim as an administrative appeal and dismissed it for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.138  On appeal, Bolden argued that the dismissal violated due process; 
that the superior court did have subject matter jurisdiction, and that his treatment in his 
cell did raise an Eighth Amendment constitutional issue.139 The court found elements of a 
§ 1983 claim based on the Eighth Amendment, but it was unclear that this was what 
Bolden intended because the superior court dismissed the action without affording 
Bolden an opportunity to be heard.140 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held 
that because it was unclear whether  a prisoner’s claim was an administrative appeal or a 
claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the superior court erred in dismissing the 
claim without notice or an opportunity to clarify the nature of the claim.141 
Bradshaw v. State, Department of Administration 
In Bradshaw v. State, Department of Administration,142 the supreme court held 
that Alaska’s ten-year statute of limitations does not bar the Alaska Division of Motor 
Vehicles (DMV) from charging a $100 statutory fee to reinstate a driver’s license.143 
Bradshaw’s license was suspended in 1995.144 In 2007, Bradshaw applied to have his 
license reinstated and the DMV charged him a $100 statutory reinstatement fee.145 
Bradshaw sued, arguing that the ten-year statute of limitations barred the DMV from 
charging the fee.146 The supreme court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the 
State,147 holding that a government agency’s charging of a fee is not an “action for a 
cause” subject to the statute of limitations.148 The court also held that the DMV properly 
charged Bradshaw the fee because the statute applies to the status of suspension and not 
the initial act of suspension.149 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that 
Alaska’s ten-year statute of limitations does not bar the DMV from charging a $100 
statutory fee to reinstate a driver’s license.150 
 
 
 
                                                 
136 Id. at *1–2. 
137 Id. at *2–3. 
138 Id. at *4–5. 
139 Id. at *7. 
140 Id. at *10, *14. 
141 Id. at *14. 
142 224 P.3d 118 (Alaska 2010).  
143 Id. at 120–21. 
144 Id. at 120. 
145 Id. at 121. 
146 Id. at 121–22. 
147 Id. at 120. 
148 Id. at 122–23.   
149 Id. at 123–26. 
150 Id. at 120–21. 
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Hertz v. Carothers 
In Hertz v. Carothers,151 the supreme court held that: (1) the execution of a 
judgment is void if improperly served even when the debtor had actual knowledge of the 
execution; and (2) section 09.08.030(f)(5) of the Alaska Statute does not conflict with 
section 33.30.201(d) of the Alaska Statute.152 The state attempted to execute a judgment 
for attorneys’ fees against Hertz, a state prisoner, by levying Hertz's prisoner trust 
account.153 Hertz had actual knowledge of the execution and the state served Hertz with a 
faxed copy of the judgment delivered by a prison guard.154 Hertz claimed he was 
improperly served and that section 09.08.030(f)(5) was invalid.155 Alaska Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4 governs personal service and requires service to be made by a peace officer 
or a person specially designated to serve notice.156 The supreme court held that the 
service violated civil rule 4, reasoning that strict adherence to the service rules was 
needed to protect the due process rights of litigants and debtors even when the debtor was 
not prejudiced by the error.157 Section 09.08.030(f)(5) explains that prisoners do not 
receive protection from judgments that low-wage earners receive.158 Section 33.30.201(d) 
provided for prisoners’ wages to be placed in a trust account for the primary purpose of 
being available for prisoners.159 Section 33.30.201 also identified the protocol for how 
prisoners’ wages should be disbursed, including for the execution of judgments.160 The 
supreme court reasoned that both statutes accommodated the execution of a judgment 
against prisoners’ trust account and thus do not conflict.161 Reversing the lower court, the 
supreme court held that: (1) the execution of a judgment is void if improperly served 
even when the debtor had actual knowledge of the execution; and (2) section 
09.08.030(f)(5) of the Alaska Statute does not conflict with section 33.30.201(d) of the 
Alaska Statute.162 
 
Hertz v. State, Department. of Corrections 
In Hertz v. State, Department of Corrections, 163  the supreme court held that the 
Alaska Prison Litigation Reform Act (“APLRA”) did not violate due process when 
barring an inmate’s claim for reinstatement of gate money.164 Hertz, a prisoner, filed a 
complaint claiming that the department of corrections had violated a 1990 Final 
Settlement Agreement (“FSA”) when it decided to stop paying “gate money” to all 
prisoners upon release.165 The superior court denied his claim, finding that Hertz had 
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failed to state a right to gate money as required by the APLRA.166  On appeal, Hertz 
argued that the FSA was a contract which created a right to gate money and he demanded 
continued prospective enforcement.167 The supreme court rejected Hertz’s argument and 
affirmed the lower court, reasoning that it was not the intentions of the parties to 
guarantee that all of the FSA’s provisions would continue indefinitely.168  Additionally, 
the supreme court held that the APLRA’s termination of prospective enforcement did not 
violate property rights.169 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the 
APLRA did not violate due process when barring an inmate’s claim for reinstatement of 
gate money.170  
 
Johnson v. Johnson 
 In Johnson v. Johnson,171 the supreme court held that it was improper to award 
full attorneys’ fees in a divorce case when the former husband raised potentially 
meritorious claims in several motions and did not act in bad faith.172 The lower court, 
applying Alaska Civil Rule 82, awarded full attorneys’ fees to Ms. Johnson at the end of 
the Johnsons’ divorce proceedings.173 Because Mr. Johnson’s claims were not completely 
devoid of legal or factual merit, they did not support a finding that he made his motions 
in bad faith.174 The supreme court held that it was improper to award full attorneys’ fees 
in a divorce case when the former husband raised potentially meritorious claims in 
several motions and did not act in bad faith.175 
 
Krause v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough 
In Krause v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough,176 the supreme court held (1) while 
damages are not available for constitutional claims, declaratory or injunctive relief is an 
appropriate and traditional relief from an unconstitutional statute, and (2) a motion for 
leave to amend a complaint to apply equitable tolling should be granted unless the claim 
is legally insufficient on its face.177 The Krauses objected to a decision made by the Mat-
Su Borough that made access to and from their property difficult and dangerous.178 After 
unsuccessful negotiations with the Borough and landowners, the Krauses filed a 
complaint with the superior court alleging a violation of a Mat-Su Borough Ordinance 
and violation of their equal protection and due process rights.179 The superior court 
dismissed their constitutional claims, ruling that this claim is unavailable when there is 
alternative relief, and it dismissed the rest of the claims as being time-barred.180 The 
                                                 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 667. 
168 Id. at 670. 
169 Id. at 669–70. 
170 Id. at 665. 
171 239 P.3d 393 (Alaska 2010).  
172 Id. at 401–03. 
173 Id. at 397. 
174 Id. at 403. 
175 Id. at 401. 
176 229 P.3d 168 (Alaska 2010). 
177 Id. at 175–176. 
178 Id. at 171. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 171–73.  
 14
Krauses then appealed.181 The supreme court reaffirmed the unavailability of a 
constitutional claim for damages when alternative remedies are available, but reversed 
the lower court’s ruling on declaratory and injunctive relief. It found these types of relief 
are “traditional” and “particularly appropriate” where constitutional rights were allegedly 
violated.182 The court also reversed the lower court’s denial of the Krauses’ motion for 
leave to amend because leave should be freely given unless the amendment would be 
futile.183 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held (1) while damages are not 
available for constitutional claims, declaratory or injunctive relief is an appropriate and 
traditional relief from an unconstitutional statute, and (2) a motion for leave to amend a 
complaint to apply equitable tolling should be granted unless the claim is legally 
insufficient on its face.184 
 
Law Project for Psychiatric Rights, Inc. v. State 
In Law Project for Psychiatric Rights, Inc. v. State,185 the supreme court held that 
a public interest law firm lacked standing to bring a suit on behalf of minors who were 
compelled to take psychotropic drugs.186 The Law Project for Psychiatric Rights (LPPR) 
filed suit against the State, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding minors’ 
rights in compelled psychotropic administration.187 The State moved for judgment on the 
pleadings and to stay discovery, arguing that LPPR lacked standing for failing to 
“identify a single individual who has been harmed by the alleged violations.”188 LPPR 
argued that it satisfied citizen-taxpayer standing.189 The superior court granted both of the 
State’s motions, reasoning that LPPR “failed to establish any parent or guardian with a 
legitimate grievance on behalf of their . . . child,” and awarded the State attorneys’ 
fees.190  The supreme court reasoned that LPPR did not establish standing because it had 
failed to demonstrate that the issues raised were of public significance or that it was an 
appropriate litigant.191  Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a public 
interest law firm lacked standing to bring a suit on behalf of minors who were compelled 
to take psychotropic drugs.192 
 
Mat-Su Regional Medical Center v. Burkhead 
 In Mat-Su Regional Medical Center v. Burkhead,193 the supreme court held that 
patients cannot assign their personal injury claims to health care providers so they may 
not intervene or bring actions on behalf of patients.194 Burkhead was injured by Voss in a 
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car accident and received medical treatment at Mat-Su.195 During the course of her 
treatment, Burkhead signed consent forms assigning all her claims for payment against 
third parties to the hospital, which also recorded a lien against Burkhead.196 Mat-Su then 
brought an action against Voss to recover the cost of Burkhead’s treatment.197 The 
superior court granted summary judgment against Mat-Su, holding that the lien remedy in 
section 34.35.475 of the Alaska Statute was Mat-Su’s exclusive remedy in such 
situations.198 On appeal, Mat-Su argued that assignation of personal injury claims was a 
common law remedy for which it did not need statutory authorization199 and that 
Alaska’s lien statute did not prohibit such assignations.200 The supreme court reasoned 
that the legislature could have adopted a statutory assignment remedy as it did in other 
areas of tort law but instead chose to create the lien remedy,201 and that if it did recognize 
assignment of personal injury claims to healthcare providers, there would be an increased 
risk of patients assigning their claims under duress or without informed consent.202 In 
addition, assignments are less necessary because health care providers are still able to 
collect money from their patients as creditors.203 Affirming the lower court, the supreme 
court held that patients cannot assign their personal injury claims to health care providers 
so they may not intervene and bring actions on behalf of patients.204 
 
Mullins v. Local Boundary Commission 
In Mullins v. Local Boundary Commission,205 the supreme court held that a 
lawsuit seeking a stay of an election may be dismissed as moot when the result of the 
election obviates the need for judicial review of the claim.206 In such cases, only 
declaratory relief is available and relief is unnecessary because similar claims will 
frequently receive judicial review.207 Mullins appealed a decision by the Local Boundary 
Commission (“LBC”) approving a petition to incorporate and sought an injunction to stay 
a public referendum necessary to certify the approval of LBC.208 The voters rejected the 
proposed incorporation.209 Mullins appealed to the supreme court.210 The supreme court 
found that, although the superior court abused its discretion by failing to grant Mullins 
the full time period to which she was entitled to file her response to LBC’s motion to 
dismiss, she was not prejudiced by the abuse because the superior court ultimately 
considered her motion for reconsideration and because the supreme court reviewed her 
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substantive objections de novo.211 The supreme court held that the election had rendered 
her claims against LBC moot, and that the public interest exception did not permit the 
court to rule here because any future misconduct by LBC would likely be challenged in 
court.212 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a lawsuit seeking a stay 
of an election may be dismissed as moot when the result of the election obviates the need 
for judicial review of the claim.213 
 
Okagawa v. Yaple 
 In Okagawa v. Yaple,214 the supreme court held that, under Alaska Rule of Civil 
Procedure 68, an award of attorneys’ fees based on reasonable hourly rates is permissible 
even when a previous contingency agreement exists.215 Yaple won damages from 
Okagawa in a tort suit and received attorneys’ fees based on an hourly rate under Rule 
68.216 Okagama argued that Yaple was not entitled to attorneys’ fees because he had a 
contingency fee agreement and that the fees were unreasonable.217 The supreme court 
held that it is permissible to award attorneys’ fees even if a contingency fee agreement is 
in place.218 The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
attorneys’ fees based on the nature and length of the case.219 The award should be based 
on the value of the services rendered, not on a previous agreement.220 Affirming the 
lower court, the supreme court held that, under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68, an 
award of attorneys’ fees based on reasonable hourly rates is permissible even when a 
previous contingency agreement exists.221 
 
Roderer v. Dash 
 In Roderer v. Dash,222 the supreme court held that dismissal, judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, and a new trial are inappropriate sanctions for a party that 
failed to timely file an expert witness report where the violation was not willful, where 
there was little resulting prejudice to the other litigant, and where the nonconforming 
party ultimately filed the appropriate report.223  Dash sued Roderer for medical 
malpractice.224 Roderer moved to dismiss when Dash’s attorney failed to file an expert 
report by the pre-trial deadline, even though Dash’s attorney filed a “working draft” of 
the report.225  The superior court denied the motion, but issued an order requiring Dash’s 
attorney to pay a sanction.226 Dash was awarded damages; Roderer moved for judgment 
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not withstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, a new trial.227  The superior court 
denied these requests and Roderer appealed.228  The supreme court affirmed the denial 
because it was not “arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable” or the result of an 
“improper motive” and because the circumstances of the discovery violation were not 
sufficiently extreme to warrant dismissal.229  The denial of Roderer’s motion for a 
directed verdict was also upheld because Roderer’s counsel failed to move for a directed 
verdict at the close of evidence, pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 50(b).230  Affirming the 
superior court, the supreme court held that dismissal, judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, and a new trial are inappropriate sanctions for a party that failed to timely file an 
expert witness report where the violation was not willful, where there was little resulting 
prejudice to the other litigant, and where the nonconforming party ultimately filed the 
appropriate report.231   
 
Schofield v. City of St. Paul 
 In Schofield v. City of St. Paul,232 the supreme court held that it is generally 
acceptable to exclude the results of an investigation by the district attorney or Police 
Standards Counsel, but it is an abuse of discretion to exclude statements made during the 
course of an investigation that potentially go to the core of an individual’s claim.233 
Schofield, a police officer in St. Paul, met with the Chief of Police after evidence arose 
that he was married to two women.234  Because of the meetings, Schofield resigned.235 In 
2006, Schofield filed suit alleging wrongful termination and constructive discharge.236 
The jury found no constructive discharge.237  On appeal, Schofield argued that the 
superior court improperly excluded the content of the meetings from evidence.238 The 
supreme court reversed the lower court, reasoning that because Schofield had resigned 
immediately after the meetings, the content was extremely relevant and the relevance 
outweighed any potential to mislead.239 Furthermore, the court found that because 
Schofield was alleging constructive termination stemming from the meetings, the content 
could corroborate his key claim, and because admitting the content of the meetings did 
not require admitting the results of the investigation, the exclusion was sufficiently 
prejudicial to constitute a reversible error.240 The supreme court held that it is generally 
acceptable to exclude the results of an investigation by the district attorney or Police 
Standards Counsel, but it is an abuse of discretion to exclude statements made during the 
course of an investigation that potentially go to the core of an individual’s claim.241  
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Schug v. Moore 
In Schug v. Moore,242 the supreme court held that discretionary acts made by the 
assistant attorney general, while working within the scope of authority as assistant 
attorney general, were protected by official immunity.243 Schug, after an unsuccessful suit 
against the Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC) for alleged personal injury while in 
DOC custody, filed a claim against Moore, the Assistant Attorney General, for “attorney 
malpractice” stemming from her role as defense attorney for DOC in Schug’s case.244 
Moore filed a motion for summary judgment, which the superior court granted on the 
grounds that Moore had absolute immunity and that Schug’s claims were “unsustainable 
as a matter of law.”245 The supreme court first determined that the complaints against 
Moore involved actions taken by Moore in her official capacity as Assistant Attorney 
General.246 The court then found that Moore’s actions were discretionary, thereby 
triggering official immunity.247 Because Schug offered no evidence that Moore acted 
“corruptly, maliciously, or in bad faith,” the court did not determine whether Moore’s 
immunity was absolute or qualified.248 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held 
that discretionary acts made by the assistant attorney general, while working within the 
scope of authority as assistant attorney general, were protected by official immunity.249 
 
Shooshanian v. Dire 
In Shooshanian v. Dire,250 the supreme court held that: (1) refusal to grant a 
continuance is valid when there is no “weighty reason” for a continuance; (2) it is not an 
abuse of discretion when a court does not inform a pro se litigant as to each step in 
litigating a claim; (3) an attorney is not a necessary witness at trial when his pretrial 
involvement is not material to the disputed facts; and (4) a tenant may be evicted when he 
has an option right to purchase the residence if a further contract is necessary to 
accomplish the purchase.251 Shooshanian attempted to exercise an option right to 
purchase a condo that he had rented for several years.252 In response, the property owner 
informed Shooshanian the property price had increased and accordingly tried to collect 
back rent.253 Nearly a year later, the owner attempted to evict Shooshanian, and the 
matter was transferred to superior court because of Shooshanian’s assertion he held “two 
option to buy leases.”254 Shooshanian’s motion for a continuance was denied, and 
Shooshanian appealed when the superior court granted the owner judgment for 
possession. Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that: (1) refusal to grant a 
continuance is valid when there is no “weighty reason” for a continuance; (2) it is not an 
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abuse of discretion when a court does not inform a pro se litigant as to each step in 
litigating a claim; (3) an attorney is not a necessary witness at trial when his pretrial 
involvement is not material to the disputed facts; and (4) a tenant may be evicted when he 
has an option right to purchase the residence if a further contract is necessary to 
accomplish the purchase.255 
 
Smallwood v. Central Peninsula General Hospital, Inc. 
 In Smallwood v. Central Peninsula General Hospital, Inc.,256 the supreme court 
held that the superior court is without jurisdiction to substitute parties or dismiss a case 
while it is on appeal.257 The supreme court also held that a plaintiff does not abandon his 
claim when he has won an injunction but fails to contest whether the defendant has 
complied with the injunction.258  Smallwood won an injunction ordering Central 
Peninsula General Hospital to stop “balance billing” Medicaid patients, but when the 
hospital submitted an affidavit describing the procedures enacted to avoid balance billing, 
Smallwood did not dispute the affidavit.259  The supreme court held that because 
Smallwood already obtained an injunction, he did not abandon his claim merely by 
failing to contest the hospital’s compliance with the injunction.260  Smallwood passed 
away while the case was on appeal.261  The superior court dismissed the case because 
another plaintiff was not substituted for Smallwood within ninety days, as required by 
Alaska Civil Rule 25(a)(1).262  The supreme court stated that once a notice of appeal is 
filed, the appellate court holds the “supervision and control” of the proceedings.263 
Therefore, superior courts lack jurisdiction to order substitution of parties, or dismissal 
due to the death of parties while cases are on appeal.264  Thus, the supreme court held that 
the superior court is without jurisdiction to substitute parties or dismiss a case while it is 
on appeal.265   
 
State Dep’t of Corr. v. Anthoney 
 In State Department of Corrections v. Anthoney,266 the supreme court upheld a 
superior court ruling that designated an inmate as the “prevailing party” in a litigation 
because he prevailed on the main issue and affirmed the superior court’s award of costs 
to the inmate.267  Anthoney, an inmate at Spring Creek Correctional Center (“SCCC”), 
was involved in an altercation while working in the kitchen.268  Anthoney claimed before 
the SCCC disciplinary committee that he did not strike the other inmate who was 
involved in the incident and that security camera footage and eyewitness testimony would 
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confirm his story.269  However, the committee did not review the footage or hear any 
witness testimony and convicted Anthoney for “mutual combat.”270  Anthoney appealed 
his conviction to the superior court and argued that he was convicted of a more severe 
charge than the one of which he was actually guilty.271  The court reduced his conviction 
to “using abusive or obscene language” and declared him to be the prevailing party in 
addition to awarding him costs of $411.44 on his motion for the same.272  The State 
appealed his designation as the prevailing party and the award of costs and argued that 
Anthoney did not prevail on the main issue because he was still guilty of violating 
correctional rules.273 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s holding that a 
prevailing party is the party that identifies and prevails on the main issue of the 
litigation.274 
 
Weimer v. Continental Car & Truck, LLC 
In Weimer v. Continental Car & Truck, LLC,275 the supreme court held that the 
statute of limitations of Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act 
(UTPA) begins to run when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, 
that the conduct in question caused a loss.276 Weimer brought a class action suit against 
an automobile dealership more than two years after purchasing his car, alleging that the 
dealership charged him a last minute preparation fee in violation of UTPA.277 The UTPA 
statute of limitation provides that “[a] person may not commence an action under this 
section more than two years after the person discovers or reasonably should have 
discovered that the loss resulted from an act or practice declared unlawful by [UTPA].278 
Although Weimer did not know that the dealership’s act was unlawful until after more 
than two years,279 the supreme court held that the language of the statute made clear that 
the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should 
have discovered, that the conduct in question caused a loss; the supreme court rejected 
Weimer’s assertion that the statute of limitations begins to toll when a plaintiff learns that 
the conduct was illegal.280 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that the 
statute of limitations of Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act 
(UTPA) begins to run when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, 
that the conduct in question caused a loss.281 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit  
 
Kirk v. Carpeneti 
In Kirk v. Carpeneti,282 the Ninth Circuit held that the nomination of state judges 
by a judicial council that is not popularly elected does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.283 In Alaska, judges are nominated by a council that 
consists of the chief justice of the state supreme court, three lay members, and three 
attorney members elected by the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar Association.284 
The plaintiffs alleged that the nomination of judges by a non-elected body violates the 
Equal Protection Clause.285 The court reasoned that the Alaska Bar Association is a 
“limited purpose entity” since it has no power to impose taxes or to enact laws,286 so its 
elections are not governed by the Equal Protection principle that citizens must be able to 
participate in elections on equal footing.287 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
nomination of state judges by a judicial council that is not popularly elected does not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.288 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
Croft v. Parnell 
In Croft v. Parnell,289 the supreme court held that a ballot initiative that proposes 
a new government program and a new tax violates article II, section 13 of the Alaska 
Constitution when the only connection between the program and the tax is the “soft 
dedication” of the tax to fund the program.290 The Lieutenant Governor denied 
certification to a ballot initiative  proposing: (1) a program that would provide public 
funding to state office candidates and (2) a tax on oil that the legislature “may 
appropriate” for the campaign finance program.291 The initiatives’ sponsors sued, and the 
superior court granted summary judgment to The Lieutenant Governor.292 On appeal, the 
sponsors argued that the initiative did not violate the Alaska Constitution’s single-subject 
rule because the tax was calibrated to collect the amount of revenue necessary to fund the 
campaign finance program and because there was a “soft dedication” of the tax to the 
program.293 The supreme court reasoned that because article IX, section 7 of the Alaska 
Constitution prohibits the binding dedication of state revenues for certain programs, a 
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“soft dedication” of funds is not enough to unite two provisions of an initiative into a 
single subject.294 Because there was no single subject embracing both the campaign 
finance program and the oil tax, the certification was correctly denied.295 Affirming the 
lower court, the supreme court held that a ballot initiative that proposes a new 
government program and a new tax violates article II, section 13 of the Alaska 
Constitution when the only connection between the program and the tax is the “soft 
dedication” of the tax to fund the program.296 
 
Kohlhaas v. State, Office of the Lieutenant Governor 
 In Kohlhaas v. State, Office of the Lieutenant Governor,297 the supreme court held 
that a ballot initiative may be denied if it either seeks secession from the Union or a 
change to the Alaska Constitution to allow secession.298 Kohlhaas proposed an initiative 
seeking a statewide vote on whether Alaska should secede from the United States and the 
lieutenant governor refused to certify it.299 Kohlhaas challenged the decision, and the 
superior court held that the refusal was proper because secession is an unconstitutional 
end.300 Kohlhaas drafted a second initiative calling for a statewide vote on whether the 
Alaska Constitution should be changed to allow secession.301 The lieutenant governor 
again refused to certify the initiative and the superior court affirmed the decision.302 
Kohlhaas appealed and the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision on two 
grounds.303 First, the state may deny a proposed initiative seeking unconstitutional ends 
because Alaska is committed to an “indestructible Union” and to upholding the United 
States Constitution.304 Because secession was at the core of Kohlhaas’s second initiative, 
it too was unconstitutional and an “improper subject for the initiative process.”305 
Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that a ballot initiative may be denied if 
it either seeks secession or a change to the Alaska Constitution to allow secession.306 
West v. State, Board of Game 
In West v. State, Board of Game,307 the supreme court held that the “sustained 
yield clause” of the Alaska Constitution and the “intensive game management statute” 
require the Board of Game (Board) to apply principles of sustained yield when managing 
predator species.308 West filed suit to challenge the Board’s 2006 predator control 
plans.309 The supreme court first held that, based on the history and plain language of the 
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sustained yield clause, the clause applies to both predator and prey species; however, 
management preference to prey populations over predator populations is not 
unconstitutional.310 Next, the court held that, based upon the text of the intensive game 
management statute and the preference for statutory construction consistent with 
constitutional principles, the sustained yield principle in the intensive management statute 
applies to predator species.311 However, because the Board’s 2006 predator control plans 
include safeguards to ensure that predator populations do not fall below certain levels, 
West did not demonstrate that the plans fail to comply with constitutional or statutory 
sustainable yield principles.312 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the 
“sustained yield clause” of the Alaska Constitution and the “intensive game management 
statute” require the Board to apply principles of sustained yield when managing predator 
species.313 
 
Alaska Court of Appeals 
 
Vann v. State 
 In Vann v. State,314 the court of appeals held that a lab technician testifying about 
a genetic test performed in part by another technician does not violate the confrontation 
clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution even though the other 
employee did not testify.315 The state charged Vann with kidnapping and sexual 
assault.316 Lab technician Duda testified for the state about the results of comparing DNA 
samples from the victim and defendant against five DNA samples from items at the crime 
scene.317 Duda tested three of the five samples, an associate, Cohen, tested two of the 
samples, and Duda interpreted and verified Cohen's results.318 Vann objected to Duda's 
testimony as a violation of his right to confront Cohen as a witness against him.319 The 
trial judge overruled Vann's objection and held that Duda's testimony needed only to 
fulfill the requirements for an expert testifying about another's work under Rule of 
Evidence 703.320 In determining the extent that the confrontation clause limited an expert 
testifying about another person's work, the court of appeals decided that an expert cannot 
act as a mere conduit for another's opinion but can offer an independent analysis based in 
part on another person's work.321 The court of appeals held that because Duda examined 
Cohen's results and made an independent verification of Cohen's conclusions, Duda's 
testimony about all five DNA samples did not violate Vann's right to confront witnesses 
against him.322 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that a lab technician 
testifying about a genetic test performed in part by another technician does not violate the 
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confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution even 
though the other employee did not testify.323 
 
CONTRACT LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Commercial Recycling Center, Ltd. v. Hobbs Industries, Inc. 
 In Commercial Recycling Center, Ltd. v. Hobbs Industries, Inc.,324 the supreme 
court held that a party to a contract cannot unilaterally rescind the agreement and a court 
will not equitably rescind the agreement if the only remaining obligation is monetary.325 
Austin and Lori Hobbs contracted with Tiplady and Cucullu to buy their Hobbs 
Industries, Inc ("HIAK") shares.326 After the Hobbs failed to perform on their payment 
obligations, Tiplady and Cucullu sent a letter purporting to rescind the contract and sold 
their shares to Commercial Recycling Center ("CRC").327 CRC sought a court order to 
establish its ownership interest in HAIK.328 The supreme court held that the letter 
attempting to rescind the agreement was invalid because one cannot rescind a contract 
unilaterally.329 It remanded for consideration whether there exists an equitable rescission 
based on a breach of fiduciary duty.330 Equity demands a rescission when one party fails 
to perform but will not grant the rescission if the only remaining performance is a 
monetary payment, because the preferred outcome is a remedy for a breach.331 An 
equitable rescission is available if a fiduciary induces a contract through unfair 
persuasion.332 The supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that a 
party to a contract cannot unilaterally rescind the agreement and a court will not equitably 
rescind the agreement if the only remaining obligation is monetary.333   
 
Wenzell v. Ingrim  
In Wenzell v. Ingrim,334 the supreme court held that while working as a dentist at a 
federal nonprofit agency is “the practice of dentistry,” but it is a disputed question of fact 
whether that practice violated a covenant not to compete.335 Ingrim sold his dental 
practice to Wenzell and signed a covenant not to compete.336 The covenant stated that 
Ingrim could not “engage in the practice of dentistry” within a fifteen mile radius for two 
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years.337 Ingrim then began working as a dentist at the Alaska Native Medical Center 
(ANMC), a federally-funded clinic providing free services to Alaska Natives, which was 
located within fifteen miles of his former practice.338 Wenzell sued, claiming that Ingrim 
had violated the covenant.339 The superior court held that Ingrim’s new position at 
ANMC did not constitute the “practice of dentistry” based on Alaska Statute 
08.36.350(a).340 On appeal, the supreme court re-examined the covenant terms and held 
that the purpose of the contract was to prevent Ingrim from competing with Wenzell, not 
to bar Ingrim from the practice of all dentistry.341 The supreme court also noted that the 
superior court had misinterpreted AS 08.36.350, because Ingrim’s work constituted the 
“practice of dentistry.”342 But the supreme court stated that when a party attempts to 
enforce a covenant not to compete against a person employed by a federally-funded non-
profit organization offering low-cost services, competition is not presumed; it must be 
proven.343 The supreme court then remanded to determine whether Ingrim’s practice 
actually competed with Wenzell’s.344 The supreme court held that a dentist working for 
the Alaska Native Service is “practicing dentistry,” and that it is a question for the fact-
finder whether this conduct violated a covenant not to compete.345 
 
CRIMINAL LAW 
top  
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
 
United States v. Hunter 
In U.S. v. Hunter,346 the Ninth Circuit held that ordering people convicted of mail 
fraud to repay wages earned through employment obtained fraudulently was an 
appropriate interpretation of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.347 Hunter stole the 
identity of a nurse in order to obtain a nursing license, which she used to obtain 
employment as a school nurse and with the Department of Labor where she was paid 
$12,558 and $5,457 respectively.348 Hunter was arrested, sentenced to ninety-six months 
incarceration, and ordered to pay back the $12,558 and $5,457, which she appealed.349 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that the Mandatory Victims Restitution 
Act “requires courts to order restitution to victims of certain criminal offenses, such as 
mail fraud.”350 Loss is determined by comparing what would have happened if the 
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criminal had acted lawfully and what actually happened.351 The employers paid for the 
services of a registered nurse which they never received and loss requires no reduction 
from all wages paid for the value of work Hunter performed.352 Affirming the lower 
court, the Ninth Circuit held that ordering people convicted of mail fraud to repay wages 
earned through employment obtained fraudulently was an appropriate interpretation of 
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.353 
 
United States v. Lozano 
In United States v. Lozano,354 the Ninth Circuit held that: (1) evidence found in 
probation and consensual searches was admissible as evidence of prior bad acts; and (2) 
transporting a package from Barrow to Anchorage and detention of the same package for 
twenty-two hours was reasonable.355 Lozano appealed his conviction of attempted 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute after a package sent to his P.O. box in 
Barrow was found to contain eleven pounds of marijuana.356 The Ninth Circuit held that 
cash and a photograph of Lozano at a marijuana “grow” were admissible under Rule of 
Evidence 404(b) because evidence of Lozano’s prior possession or sale of drugs was 
material to the charges and not too remote in time.357 The Ninth Circuit also held that the 
decision to detain the package was reasonable because Lozano had earlier asked whether 
mail could be searched for drugs and the package listed a fictitious sender and 
addressee.358 Further, the delay was reasonable because it was less than one day and part 
of the delay came from the remoteness of Barrow.359 Affirming the lower court, the Ninth 
Circuit held that: (1) evidence found in probation and consensual searches was admissible 
as evidence of prior bad acts; and (2) transporting a package from Barrow to Anchorage 
and detention of the same package for twenty-two hours was reasonable.360 
 
United States District Court for the District of Alaska 
 
Stavenjord v. Schmidt 
 In Stavenjord v. Schmidt,361 a magistrate judge recommended the denial of a 
prisoner’s habeas petition because the state court of appeals’ rejection of the prisoner’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to federal law and was not an 
unreasonable application of federal law.362  Stavenjord was convicted of first-degree 
murder.363  On appeal, his lawyers did not argue that that the police lacked probable 
cause to substantiate search warrants of Stavenjord’s home.364  After reviewing the 
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record, the magistrate judge determined that Stavenjord’s appellate lawyers made a 
strategic choice in their argument selection.365  The magistrate judge noted that attorneys 
have the obligation to winnow out less meritorious claims on appeal.366  Because 
Stavenjord did not identify acts or omissions by his lawyers that were outside the range 
of competent legal assistance, the state court of appeals did not err when denying his 
claim.367  Thus, the magistrate judge recommended the denial of a prisoner’s habeas 
petition because the state court of appeals’ rejection of the prisoner’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to federal law and was not an unreasonable 
application of federal law.368   
 
U.S. v. Mujahid 
 In U.S. v. Mujahid,369 the district court held that the Anchorage Division’s jury 
selection process did not violate constitutional or statutory law even though African-
Americans were underrepresented in jury pools.370 Mujahid, an African-American, 
moved for an alternative jury selection process because African-Americans constitute 
5.2% of the Anchorage Division’s population but only 2.06% of master jury wheels in the 
district.371  He argued that the 60% comparative disparity violated constitutional and 
statutory fair cross-section requirements, and that the jury wheels could be more 
representative by using a different selection process.372  The court reasoned that district 
courts must look at absolute disparities, not comparative disparities, and that an absolute 
disparity of 3.14% is not sufficient to change the jury selection process.373  In addition, 
reliance on voter lists is facially neutral and not susceptible to abuse.374  The district court 
held that the Anchorage Division’s jury selection process did not violate constitutional or 
statutory law even though African-Americans were underrepresented in jury pools.375 
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Diaz v. State 
In Diaz v. State,376 the supreme court held that an inmate in electronic monitoring 
is still in custody and therefore complaints relating to custody and interrogation by 
Department of Correction (DOC) officers should be examined under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and not the Fourth Amendment.377 While serving in an electronic 
monitoring program, Diaz was accused of misconduct, taken into custody for 
questioning, and eventually returned to jail.378 Diaz filed a § 1983 claim against the DOC 
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for violating her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments during the 
questioning.379 Because inmates in electronic monitoring are still considered in custody, 
Diaz was in DOC custody when the officers picked her up.380 Accordingly, her 
complaints are not evaluated under the Fourth Amendment, only under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.381 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that an inmate in 
electronic monitoring is still in custody and therefore complaints relating to custody and 
interrogation by DOC officers should be examined under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and not the Fourth Amendment.382 
Greenwood v. State 
In Greenwood v. State,383 the supreme court held that a defendant arrested for 
drunk driving is entitled to a jury instruction on the necessity defense as long as there is 
some evidence that: (1) the defendant sought to prevent significant evil; (2) the defendant 
reasonably believed there was no adequate alternative; (3) given the facts perceived by 
the defendant, the harm avoided was not disproportionate to the harm caused; and (4) the 
defendant stopped driving as soon as she reasonably believed the necessity ended.384 
After drinking with Way, Greenwood overheard Way mumble that he was going to burn 
down Greenwood’s camper and his parents’ home and leave no witnesses.385 Greenwood 
witnessed Way throw candles inside her camper, hit her dog, and start driving around on 
his four wheeler.386 In response, Greenwood called the police, drove to Way’s parents’ 
house, honked her horn in warning, and then drove to the main road to meet the police.387 
The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the necessity defense, and Greenwood was 
convicted of drunk driving.388 The supreme court reversed, reasoning that there was some 
evidence showing that until Greenwood stopped to wait for the police, she saw driving as 
the only way to prevent arson and physical harm to herself and Way’s parents.389 The 
court further reasoned that because Greenwood took precautions, there was some 
evidence that Greenwood’s drunk driving was relatively less serious than the harms she 
sought to prevent.390 The supreme court held that a defendant arrested for drunk driving 
is entitled to a jury instruction on the necessity defense as long as there is some evidence 
that: (1) the defendant sought to prevent significant evil; (2) the defendant reasonably 
believed there was no adequate alternative; (3) given the facts perceived by the 
defendant, the harm avoided was not disproportionate to the harm caused; and (4) the 
defendant stopped driving as soon as she reasonably believed the necessity ended.391 
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Kalmakoff v. State 
In Kalmakoff v. State,392 the supreme court held that the trial court must determine 
certain issues of fact before considering whether an individual was in custody for 
purposes of determining the legality of subsequent statements.393 Kalmakoff gave 
statements to Alaska State Troopers during a series of four interviews.394 The trial court 
admitted ostensibly confessional statements made during two of these interviews and 
portions of a third interview.395 Kalmakoff appealed the decision and argued that the 
interviews were inadmissible because they were tainted by portions of the interviews 
which were found inadmissible.396 To determine whether subsequent interviews have 
“purge[d] the taint” of prior inadmissible interviews, courts must consider several factors 
related to the defendant’s condition in between the interviews.397 The supreme court held 
that earlier, inadmissible inculpatory statements may have played a role in Kalmakoff’s 
participation in the interviews, which were found to be admissible.398 Therefore, the court 
remanded, holding that the trial court must determine certain issues of fact before 
considering whether an individual was in custody for purposes of determining the legality 
of subsequent statements.399 
 
Marshall v. State 
 In Marshall v. State,400 the supreme court held that the right against self-
incrimination requires a trial court to hold a hearing on the affirmative defense of 
entrapment even when the defendant fails to submit evidence supporting each element of 
the defense.401 Marshall was convicted of selling OxyContin pills to an undercover police 
officer.402 The superior court denied his motion for a hearing on an entrapment defense 
because he failed to allege specific evidence that supported his claim that the pills did not 
belong to him.403 The supreme court held that the trial court was required to hold a 
hearing on the affirmative defense of entrapment in this situation because requiring the 
defendant to submit an affidavit alleging specific evidence is contrary to Alaska’s right 
against self-incrimination.404 In such a hearing, the defendant may establish his or her 
defense by relying on methods outside of his or her own testimony.405 The supreme court 
remanded the case to the superior court, holding that the right against self-incrimination 
requires a trial court to hold a hearing on the affirmative defense of entrapment even 
when the defendant fails to submit evidence supporting each element of the defense.406 
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Alaska Court of Appeals 
 
Andrew v. State 
In Andrew v. State,407 the court of appeals held that: (1) pursuant to section 
11.16.100 of the Alaska Statutes, there is no distinction between proving a defendant’s 
culpability with evidence related to her own personal conduct and proving a defendant’s 
culpability with evidence related to her vicarious responsibility for the conduct of an 
accomplice; and (2) juries are not required to specify any such distinction in their 
verdict.408 Andrew and her boyfriend, Haws, burglarized a home, stole several items, and 
concealed the items among several other stolen items from earlier burglaries.409 Andrew 
appeared to have played a lesser role in the burglary than Haws.410 Andrew was 
convicted of burglary of a residence and theft.411 Andrew argued on appeal that (1) the 
evidence may have supported a conviction based on her vicarious liability but did not 
support a conviction based on her personal conduct; and (2) the jury’s failure to specify 
the theory under which she was convicted renders the verdicts invalid.412 The court of 
appeals disagreed, noting that it is immaterial whether the defendant is convicted for her 
own acts or those of an accomplice for whom she is legally responsible.413 Additionally, 
so long as only one criminal act is alleged, the jury does not have to unanimously 
articulate one theory for conviction if multiple theories are sufficient to prove the 
defendant’s guilt.414 Affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that: (1) 
pursuant to section 11.16.100 of the Alaska Statutes, there is no distinction between 
proving a defendant’s culpability with evidence related to her own personal conduct and 
proving a defendant’s culpability with evidence related to her vicarious responsibility for 
the conduct of an accomplice; and (2) juries are not required to specify any such 
distinction in their verdict.415 
B.F.L. v. State 
In B.F.L. v. State,416 the court of appeals held that when the superior court 
determines that a minor in a juvenile delinquency proceeding needs ongoing government 
supervision, the superior court must impose the least restrictive alternative that will 
satisfy the minor’s rehabilitative needs and protect the public.417 B.F.L. had a three year 
history of juvenile delinquency that included failures on probation and in non-detention 
placements.418 Following a hearing in 2009, the superior court imposed the most 
restrictive of the three dispositions in Alaska Statute 47.12.120(b).419 On appeal, B.F.L 
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argued that the superior court failed to adequately consider the two less-restrictive 
dispositions, both of which would have kept B.F.L. out of a detention facility.420 The 
court of appeals first held that its prior holdings—which required courts to refrain from 
removing children from their homes “in all but extreme cases”—had been superseded by 
Delinquency Rule 11(e) and Alaska Statute 47.12.140(2),421 which require courts to 
impose the least restrictive alternative given the needs of the minor and the need to 
protect the public.422 The court then held that the record supported the conclusion that a 
detention disposition was the least restrictive alternative for B.F.L.423 Affirming the lower 
court, the court of appeals held that in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the superior 
court must choose the least restrictive disposition that will satisfy the two goals of 
rehabilitating the minor and protecting the public.424 
 
Chase v. State  
In Chase v. State,425 the court of appeals: (1) held that Alaska’s mandatory 
seatbelt law was supported by a sufficient public interest; and (2) rejected the defendant’s 
claim that it was an unconstitutional means of providing pretext for police stops.426 Chase 
was pulled over in Fairbanks for driving while not wearing a seatbelt.427 During the 
traffic stop, the officer discovered that Chase’s drivers’ license had been revoked.428 He 
was arrested and convicted on several misdemeanors.429 Chase claimed that the seatbelt 
law facially violates Article I, Section I of the Alaska Constitution, which guarantees 
liberty and autonomy and argued that there was no public benefit from the law.430 The 
court of appeals cited legislative history that the Alaska law would reduce deaths and 
injuries from car accidents.431 Finally, the court of appeals held the seatbelt law was not 
merely a pretext for officers to stop citizens looking for other crimes.432 The court of 
appeals: (1) held that Alaska’s mandatory seatbelt law was supported by a sufficient 
public interest; and (2) rejected the defendant’s claim that it was an unconstitutional 
means of providing pretext for police stops.433 
 
Clark v. State 
In Clark v. State,434 the court of appeals held that police properly seized and 
opened property left in a stolen vehicle based on the vehicle owner’s consent to the 
search and the property owner’s reduced privacy interest in the item left in the car.435 
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Officers detained Clark after she got into the passenger seat of a vehicle that had been 
reported stolen.436 With the permission of the vehicle’s owner, Roatch, the officers 
searched the car and found a cigarette case containing packets of cocaine, which Clark 
later admitted belonged to her.437 Clark argued that the evidence regarding the cocaine 
and her statements about it should be suppressed because the officers did not have a 
warrant to search the car.438 However, the court determined that the search was 
appropriate because Roatch consented to it, and officers are empowered to conduct 
warrantless searches, including opening contents related to the search, if they have the 
general consent of the person who has control of the place to be searched.439 The court 
also noted that Roatch could agree to the search of the property Clark left in the car 
because someone who leaves property in a stolen vehicle has no expectation of privacy 
with respect to that property.440 In response to Clark’s argument that she did not know the 
car was stolen, the court explained that the salient issue was actually whether the officers 
on the scene could have reasonably believed that the car was stolen and were therefore 
justified in concluding that Clark had a reduced privacy interest in any property she left 
in the vehicle.441 Since the officers reasonably concluded that the car was stolen, the court 
of appeals held that it was proper to determine that the owner of any property left in the 
car had a reduced expectation of privacy and that the property was subject to search with 
the consent of the vehicle’s owner.442 
 
Davis v. State 
 In Davis v. State,443 the court of appeals held that the State was entitled to enforce 
laws that were adopted from federal regulations, and that a tractor-trailer was considered 
a commercial motor vehicle, even if it was not used exclusively for commercial 
purposes.444 During a routine commercial vehicle inspection, Davis’s tractor-trailer was 
ordered “out of service” for noncompliance with state rules for commercial vehicles.445 
Davis was stopped four hours later and cited for operating a commercial vehicle that had 
been placed “out of service.”446 A year later, he was cited for driving a commercial 
vehicle without the required medical examiner’s certificate.447 Though Davis asserted 
that the State lacked the authority to enforce federal law regulating commercial vehicles, 
the court disagreed because the federal regulations had been adopted as state law; 
therefore, it was state law that Davis violated.448 Davis also disputed that he was driving a 
commercial motor vehicle because he was using his truck for non-commercial 
purposes.449 The court rejected this argument because the only tractor-trailers that are 
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excluded from the scope of these commercial vehicle regulations laws are those that are 
used exclusively for non-commercial purposes.450 Davis could not show that his tractor-
trailer was used exclusively for non-commercial purposes and thus fell under the 
exception.451 Affirming the lower courts, the court of appeals held that the State was 
entitled to enforce state laws adopted from federal regulations, and that a tractor-trailer 
was considered a commercial motor vehicle, even if it was sometimes used for non-
commercial purposes.452 
 
Fallon v. State 
 In Fallon v. State,453 the court of appeals held that a trooper’s stop was a valid 
caretaker stop and the trooper was authorized to request the defendant’s driver’s license, 
and the defendant resisted arrest by force because his conduct went beyond non-
submission.454 Fallon was arrested after a trooper saw his vehicle in a ditch.455 The 
trooper concluded Fallon had been drinking and arrested him for driving under the 
influence.456 During the arrest, Fallon pushed his body away from the car and became 
belligerent, so the trooper had to use pepper spray.457 Fallon was convicted of driving 
under the influence and resisting arrest.458 Fallon appealed, arguing that he was illegally 
seized when the trooper retained his driver’s license for several minutes and that the court 
should have suppressed the evidence as a result.459 The court of appeals found the 
trooper’s stop to be a valid community caretaker stop, allowing seizure without suspicion 
of criminal activity because Fallon’s vehicle was in a ditch, where the driver might have 
needed help.460 Defining “force,” the court concluded Fallon’s behavior and continual 
struggle differed from mere non-submission.461 The court of appeals affirmed the 
superior court’s ruling, holding that a trooper’s stop was a valid caretaker stop and the 
trooper was authorized to request the defendant’s driver’s license, and the defendant 
resisted arrest by force because his conduct went beyond non-submission.462   
 
Felber v. State 
In Felber v. State,463 the court of appeals held that a defendant who pleads guilty 
to multiple crimes and receives a composite sentence cannot successfully appeal the 
length of his sentence if the sentence is within the aggregated guideline ranges of 
crimes.464 Felber was a third-felony offender465 who pled guilty, inter alia, to second-
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degree murder, vehicle theft, and four counts of first-degree assault in exchange for a 
sentence of between fifty and eighty-five years.466 At the sentencing hearing, Felber 
asked the superior court judge to rescind the plea agreement because he felt the proposed 
sentence was too long for what he had done.467 The judge refused and sentenced Felber to 
sixty-six years in prison.468 On appeal, Felber argued that because a second-degree 
murder conviction would only result in a thirty-year sentence, the judge should have 
rescinded the plea agreement.469 When reviewing a composite sentence, however, the 
court of appeals looks at the potential aggregated sentences for all of the crimes to which 
the defendant pleaded guilty.470 The aggregated potential sentences for Felber’s multiple 
crimes would have been 246 years.471 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held 
that a defendant who pleads guilty to multiple crimes and receives a composite sentence 
cannot successfully appeal the length of his sentence if the sentence is within the 
aggregated guideline ranges of crimes.472 
 
Forster v. State  
In Forster v. State,473 the court of appeals held that one illegally obtained 
statement does not taint future legal interrogations where Miranda rights were waived; 
good-time credit or mandatory parole cannot be withheld without further findings.474 
Forster shot and killed a uniformed police officer.475 Forster was interrogated five times 
in a five-day span, with four instances occurring after his first court appearance.476 The 
superior court suppressed the first and fifth interrogations due to Miranda and Sixth 
Amendment violations, respectively, but convicted Forster of murder based on the other 
interrogations and sentenced him to 99 years in prison.477 Forster appealed on grounds 
that the three other interrogations should have been suppressed due to violations of his 
rights.478 The State cross-appealed on grounds that the trial court erred in its 
sentencing.479 The court of appeals found that, while Forster’s mental state did not permit 
him to competently waive his Miranda rights for the first interrogation, the intervening 
court appearance between the first and second interrogations sufficiently reduced his 
stress levels enough for him to knowingly waive his rights thereafter.480 Addressing the 
State’s cross appeal, the court ruled that murder of a uniformed police officer engaged in 
official duties carries a 99-year mandatory sentence without the possibility of any parole 
or credit under Alaska law.481 In Forster’s case, the jury was not asked to find whether the 
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murdered officer was engaged in official duties, and the trial judge ruled that this did not 
permit the mandatory sentence; he instead imposed the maximum sentence within the 
normal first-degree murder range and left Forster eligible for good-time credit and both 
discretionary and mandatory parole.482 Thus, the court of appeals held that one illegally 
obtained statement does not taint future legal interrogations where Miranda rights were 
waived; good-time credit or mandatory parole cannot be withheld without further 
findings.483 
 
Lestenkof v. State 
 In Lestenkof v. State,484 the court of appeals affirmed a trial court’s decision to 
move a trial to another location because the judge made a reasonable, diligent attempt to 
seat a jury where the alleged offense occurred.485 The trial judge encountered problems 
trying to seat a jury for Lestenkof’s trial in Saint Paul and, after four days of jury 
selection, only 11 prospective jurors had not been excused.486 After examining several 
options, the trial judge determined that the only alternative was to change venue.487 The 
judge eventually transferred the trial to Dillingham.488 The court of appeals found that the 
trial judge made considerable efforts to empanel a jury before moving the trial and that 
any additional steps the judge could have taken to empanel a jury in Saint Paul were 
unreasonable.489 The court of appeals also found that the Dillingham jury was a fair cross 
section of the Saint Paul community because the Dillingham community has a similar 
composition to Saint Paul490 and there was no record of any cognizable group being 
underrepresented in Dillingham.491 Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed a trial court’s 
decision to move a trial to another location because it made a reasonable, diligent attempt 
to seat a jury where the alleged offense occurred.492 
 
Procter v. State 
 In Proctor v. State,493 the court of appeals held using evidence of behavior in 
prison to establish patterns does not violate a person’s right to confrontation even though 
he would have to admit he had been incarcerated in order to cross-examine witnesses 
testifying about his time in prison.494 Proctor was arrested after a neighbor, who had 
witnessed him yelling and hitting a woman, called the police. In a jury trial, Proctor was 
convicted of second and third degree assault.495 On appeal, Proctor argued that the trial 
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court improperly admitted evidence of his behavior in prison.496 The court noted that 
while “character evidence is generally inadmissible” because Proctor had claimed he was 
not the aggressor, the state could introduce such evidence to rebut his claim.497 The court 
of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to allow the state to introduce evidence of 
Proctor’s behavior while incarcerated because it was a community with which he 
habitually associated.498 Proctor argued that his right to confrontation was violated by the 
correctional officer’s testimony because he could not cross-examine him without 
revealing that he had previously been incarcerated.499 The court held that Proctor’s right 
had not been violated because his decision not to cross-examine the officer was a 
strategic move.500 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held using evidence of 
behavior in prison to establish patterns does not violate a person’s right to confrontation 
even though he would have to admit he had been incarcerated in order to cross-examine 
witnesses testifying about his time in prison.501 
 
Rogers v. State 
 In Rogers v. State,502 the court of appeals held that a defendant in a felony 
prosecution can be convicted of an offense other than the one charged in the indictment 
as long as the grand jury’s findings include the essential elements of that offense.503 
Rogers’s gun discharged in a bar, killing the victim.504 Rogers was indicted for first-
degree murder.505 At trial, the prosecution alleged that Rogers intentionally fired the gun 
at the victim, while the defense argued that Rogers’s gun had accidentally fired.506 The 
jury convicted Rogers of manslaughter.507 Rogers appealed, arguing that there was a 
“fatal variance” between the trial jury’s manslaughter verdict and the grand jury’s 
indictment for first-degree murder.508 The court of appeals held that a defendant can be 
found guilty of a lesser offense that is “necessarily included” in the charged offense.509 
Whether a lesser offense is included in the charged offense depends on the facts charged 
in the indictment and the evidence presented at trial.510 Because Rogers’s manslaughter 
conviction flowed from the evidence presented at trial,511 and because the grand jury 
finding of intentional killing included the essential elements of reckless killing, the court 
held that there was no fatal variance.512 Affirming the superior court’s denial of Rogers’s 
motion to dismiss, the court of appeals held that a defendant in a felony prosecution can 
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be convicted of an offense other than the one charged in the indictment as long as the 
grand jury’s findings include the essential elements of that offense.513 
 
Silvera v. State 
 In Silvera v. State,514 the court of appeals held that words or actions directed at 
third parties could be evidence of serious provocation with respect to mitigating 
factors.515 Silvera along with Surina (his fiancée), Moore, and others took a taxi cab after 
spending the night drinking.516 An argument ensued and Moore allegedly called Surina a 
“whore” and then kicked her.517 Silvera then jumped up and cut the side of Moore’s face 
with a knife.518 At sentencing, the trial judge rejected the mitigating factor of serious 
provocation because the provoking acts and words were not directed at Silvera.519 Silvera 
appealed.520 The court of appeals held that provocation can be found when the actions 
were directed either at the defendant or at someone the defendant was defending.521 The 
court reasoned that to find otherwise would prohibit a finding of serious provocation in 
circumstances in which the heat of passion defense has traditionally been allowed.522 
Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals held that words or actions directed at third 
parties could be evidence of serious provocation with respect to mitigating factors.523 
 
Smith v. State 
 In Smith v. State,524 the court of appeals held that a sixteen-year-old defendant 
involved in a shooting is not entitled to statutory mitigation of his sentence for duress or 
compulsion based on a theory that he was provoked, but the defendant may be entitled to 
non-statutory mitigation because of his extraordinary potential for rehabilitation and his 
developmental immaturity.525  Smith, a sixteen year old, entered a plea of guilty as an 
adult to first-degree assault for providing a cohort with a handgun, with which the cohort 
then wounded another teenager.526  At sentencing, Smith requested mediation on three 
grounds: (1) duress, coercion, threat, or compulsion; (2) extraordinary potential for 
rehabilitation; and (3) developmental immaturity.527 Developmental immaturity is a 
mitigating factor that Alaska courts have not yet recognized.528  Despite evidence that the 
victim provoked Smith, the superior court rejected Smith’s request for mitigation based 
on duress mental or emotional compulsion does not meet the standards for provocation as 
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defined in Alaska statutes.529  The superior court also rejected Smith’s non-statutory 
mitigating factors despite considerable testimony by Smith’s experts supporting his 
position without making any findings of fact as to the merit of the mitigating factors in 
Smith’s case.530  The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s rejection of Smith’s 
statutory duress mitigating factor argument but vacated the superior court’s rulings as to 
the non-statutory mitigating factors and remanded the case for reconsideration to include 
findings of fact.531  In addition, the court of appeals tepidly supported developmental 
immaturity as a new mitigating factor, citing United States Supreme Court precedent.532  
Affirming in part and vacating in part, the court of appeals held that a sixteen-year-old 
defendant involved in a shooting is not entitled to statutory mitigation of his sentence for 
duress or compulsion based on a theory that he was provoked, but the defendant may be 
entitled to non-statutory mitigation because of his extraordinary potential for 
rehabilitation and his developmental immaturity.533   
 
Solomon v. State 
 In Solomon v. State,534 the court of appeals held that although Alaska recognizes a 
defense of unwitting intoxication to a DUI charge, the defense is available only if the 
defendant became intoxicated due to a reasonable, non-negligent mistake about the 
intoxicating nature of the substance the defendant ingested.535  Solomon was arrested for 
driving under the influence and argued at his trial that he had not been drinking but had 
ingested a quart of NyQuil.536  Solomon stated that he had not read the label on the bottle 
and did not realize that NyQuil contains ten percent alcohol.537  Solomon requested a jury 
instruction on the defense of unwitting intoxication because he did not have actual 
knowledge that he had consumed an intoxicating substance, but the superior court judge 
denied the request.538  The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the jury instruction.539  
Solomon contended that this defense should be allowed when a defendant does not 
knowingly consume an intoxicant and that the State should be forced to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the intoxicant was knowingly consumed.540  The court of appeals 
found cases from other jurisdictions persuasive that limited the defense to instances in 
which a defendant non-negligently consumed a substance that he reasonably believed 
was not intoxicating.541 Because no reasonable juror could have believed that Solomon’s 
failure to read the label on the NyQuil bottle was non-negligent, the court of appeals 
affirmed the lower court ruling.542  The court of appeals held that although Alaska 
recognizes a defense of unwitting intoxication to a DUI charge, the defense is available 
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only if the defendant became intoxicated due to a reasonable, non-negligent mistake 
about the intoxicating nature of the substance the defendant ingested.543 
 
Starkweather v. State  
In Starkweather v. State,544 the court of appeals held that when criminal 
defendants are convicted of both first degree assault and attempted murder, the crimes 
must be merged for sentencing purposes.545 Starkweather was convicted of burglary, 
theft, sexual assault, attempted murder, and first-degree assault after attacking his 
neighbor.546 Starkweather argued during sentencing in the superior court that he should 
not receive separate sentences and punishments for attempted murder and first degree 
assault because they arose from the same act and, if not merged, would constitute double 
jeopardy.547 The superior court denied his claim, reasoning that assault and attempted 
murder were sufficiently discrete crimes to support separate convictions and 
punishments.548 The court of appeals reversed, holding that legislative indicated 
attempted murder and assault were not meant to be punished as separate crimes, and that 
the nature of the conduct should instead be considered only as an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance in sentencing.549 The court of appeals held that criminal 
defendants may be charged with both attempted murder and assault, but if the jury finds 
both crimes to be proven, they must be merged into a single conviction for attempted 
murder.550 
 
State v. Shetters 
In State v. Shetters,551 the court of appeals held that a defendant is entitled to good 
time credit for time spent in a correctional center or halfway house as a condition of 
mandatory parole and for time spent there pending final decision about parole 
revocation.552 Shetters was released on mandatory parole, but he was taken back into 
custody, based on concerns of parole violation, and released to a “correctional restitution 
center” (CRC) while the parole board determined whether to revoke his parole.553 The 
Board permitted him to stay on parole so long as he remained at the CRC for four 
additional months.554 He was arrested for another parole violation, after which he 
returned to jail; he was not given credit toward his release date for his time spent in the 
CRC.555 The court determined that serving mandatory parole is tantamount to serving 
time in prison and does not mitigate a sentence like parole.556 Reversing the lower court, 
the court of appeals held that a defendant is entitled to good time credit for time spent in a 
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correctional center or halfway house as a condition of mandatory parole and for time 
spent there pending final decision about parole revocation.557 
 
State v. Shetters (On Rehearing) 
 In State v. Shetters,558 the court of appeals held that mandatory parolees remanded 
to a non-prison correctional center by the Parole Board are entitled to credit for time 
served and good time credit if they are later ordered to serve their remaining sentence.559 
The State of Alaska petitioned the court of appeals to reconsider a prior holding.560 The 
state challenged the court’s prior holding by making two arguments: (1) parolees that 
reside at non-prison correctional centers are entitled to good time credit but not time 
served credit; and (2) the Parole Board may use its discretion in awarding credit for time 
served to parolees residing at non-prison correctional centers.561 The court of appeals 
rejected both of these arguments, reasoning that there are no situations where an inmate 
may be entitled to good time credit but not for time served.562 The court of appeals also 
held that credit for time served is not a discretionary reduction of the defendant’s time to 
serve.563 Re-affirming its prior decision, the court of appeals held that mandatory parolees 
remanded to a non-prison correctional center by the Parole Board are entitled to credit for 
time served and good time credit if they are later ordered to serve their remaining 
sentence.564 
 
State v. Siftsoff 
 In State v. Siftsoff,565 the court of appeals held that the hot pursuit warrant 
exception did not apply when a police officer followed a speeder home and entered his 
home without showing a compelling need for immediate action.566 A police officer was in 
pursuit of Siftsoff for a speeding violation and eventually ended up at his trailer home.567 
The officer told him not to enter the trailer, but Siftsoff ignored him.568 The officer then 
entered the trailer and observed that Siftsoff was intoxicated.569 The trial court judge 
excluded the evidence of intoxication.570 The court of appeals reasoned that because the 
officer had not shown “a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a 
warrant” the judge correctly suppressed the evidence.571 The court of appeals affirmed 
the district court and held that the hot pursuit warrant exception did not apply when a 
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police officer followed a speeder home and entered his home without showing a 
compelling need for immediate action.572 
 
Twogood v. State 
In Twogood v. State,573 the court of appeals held that: (1) the amendment of a 
prior judgment did not constitute a new sentencing act that would entitle a defendant to 
an appearance before the court;574 (2) it was not plain error to require a sex offender to 
submit to random drug testing if he had a history of substance abuse;575 and (3) the 
Department of Correction’s (DOC) elimination of programs a defendant was required to 
complete while incarcerated should have been addressed in a civil action against DOC.576 
Twogood was indicted on multiple felony counts.577 As part of his plea, Twogood was 
permitted to serve his sentences consecutively, though the judge refused to specify the 
order of the sentences.578 On appeal, the court of appeals clarified the order and directed 
the superior court to amend its earlier judgment.579 Twogood appealed.580 He argued that 
the modifications effectively served as a new sentence, entitling him to address the judge 
in person.581 The court of appeals held that the amendments were merely ministerial 
because the superior court judge had no discretion in making them.582 Twogood also 
appealed a requirement that he submit to random drug screenings, arguing that the 
necessary “direct relationship” between this condition and his crime was absent.583 The 
court held that because “direct relationship” requirement is interpreted broadly the judge 
did not commit plain error by including this condition based on Twogood’s history of 
drug abuse.584 Twogood further claimed that, because the DOC had stopped counseling 
incarcerated prisoners, he was denied his right to the rehabilitative treatment that he was 
ordered to complete.585 The court of appeals referred him to the DOC.586 Affirming the 
lower court, the court of appeals held that: (1) the amendment of a prior judgment did not 
constitute a new sentencing act that would entitle a defendant to an appearance before the 
court;587 (2) it was not plain error to require a sex offender to submit to random drug 
testing if he had a history of substance abuse;588 and (3) the DOC’s elimination of 
programs a defendant was required to complete while incarcerated should have been 
addressed in a civil action against the DOC.589  
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Wilson v. State 
In Wilson v. State,590 the court of appeals held that a prima facie case of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is established when an individual is advised that entering 
a no-contest plea in a criminal trial will not prejudice a later civil case against that 
individual.591  Wilson pled no-contest to a charge of assault in the second degree.592  
Wilson’s attorney advised him that entering the no-contest plea could not be used in a 
civil trial as proof of the plaintiff’s allegations.593 The court of appeals reasoned that, 
while there is normally a presumption of competence in ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, this presumption does not apply to advice relating to whether or not to enter a 
plea to a criminal charge.594 Thus, the court of appeals held that a prima facie case of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is established when an individual is advised that entering 
a no-contest plea in a criminal trial will not prejudice a later civil case against that 
individual.595   
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
 
United States v. Lightfoot 
 In United States v. Lightfoot,596 the Ninth Circuit held that, when a criminal 
defendant pleading guilty waives his right to appeal his sentence, the waiver does not 
encompass his right to appeal a subsequent decision by the district court not to reduce the 
defendant’s sentence under section 3582(c)(2) of the United States Code, unless the 
waiver expressly states as much.597 Lightfoot pled guilty to, inter alia, possession of 
crack cocaine with intent to distribute; his plea included a broad waiver of his right to 
appeal the resulting sentence, and he was sentenced within the then-applicable guidelines 
range.598 Subsequently, the United States Sentencing Commission reduced the guidelines 
range for possession of crack cocaine and gave the reduction retroactive effect.599 
Lightfoot filed a motion for reduction of his sentence pursuant to section 3582(c)(2) of 
the United States Code, which the government opposed, asserting that Lightfoot posed a 
continuing danger to society.600 The court held that motions for reduction of sentence are 
“discretionary decision[s] separate from the original sentencing,” and the parties to the 
original plea agreement probably did not contemplate whether the waiver encompassed 
the right to appeal a section 3582(c)(2) decision, or else the agreement would have 
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“expressly included or expressly excluded” a statement to that effect.601 Moreover, 
because section 3582(c)(2) motions are substantially different proceedings, they do not 
constitute an attack on the original sentence to which the waiver applied.602 Thus, the 
Ninth Circuit held that, when a criminal defendant pleading guilty waives his right to 
appeal his sentence, the waiver does not encompass his right to appeal a subsequent 
decision by the district court not to reduce the defendant’s sentence under section 
3582(c)(2) of the United States Code, unless the waiver expressly states as much.603   
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Bailey v. State, Department of Corrections 
In Bailey v. State, Department of Corrections,604 the supreme court held that 
parole should not be revoked for failure to participate in a substance abuse program when 
the parole board did not inform the parolee that failure to participate in a program would 
result in automatic revocation of parole.605 Bailey’s judgment mandated that he 
successfully complete substance abuse treatment if offered during his incarceration.606 
After Bailey unsuccessfully applied to various programs, a parole violation hearing was 
held and Bailey was instructed to apply for substance abuse treatment.607 Bailey applied 
to the program but was not admitted,608 and, after a year, his parole was revoked for 
failure to complete offered substance abuse treatment.609 The superior court affirmed the 
revocation.610 On appeal, Bailey alleged that he did not have sufficient notice that his 
failure to be accepted into the program would result in revocation of his parole.611 The 
court acknowledged that due process required reasonable notice of what conditions must 
be met to prevent parole revocation and reasoned that, during the parole violation 
hearing, the parole board had simply ordered Bailey to apply to programs and had not 
made it clear that if Bailey’s application was rejected his parole would be automatically 
revoked.612 The court found that Bailey’s original judgment did not provide constructive 
notice, because it only required him to enter a program if it was offered.613 Reversing the 
decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that parole should not be revoked for 
failure to participate in a substance abuse program when the parole board did not inform 
the parolee that failure to participate in a program would result in automatic revocation of 
parole.614 
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Bradshaw v. State, Department of Administration 
In Bradshaw v. State, Department of Administration,615 the supreme court held 
that Alaska’s ten-year statute of limitations does not bar the Alaska Division of Motor 
Vehicles (“DMV”) from charging a $100 statutory fee to reinstate the driver’s license of 
a person whose license suspension began over ten years prior to applying for 
reinstatement.616 Bradshaw’s license was suspended in 1995.617 In 2007, Bradshaw 
applied to have his license reinstated, and the DMV charged him a $100 statutory 
reinstatement fee.618 Bradshaw sued, arguing that the ten-year statute of limitations 
barred the DMV from charging the fee.619 The supreme court affirmed the grant of 
summary judgment to the State,620 holding that a government agency’s charging of a fee 
is not an “action for a cause” subject to the statute of limitations.621 The court also held 
that the DMV properly charged Bradshaw the fee under Alaska Statute 
28.15.271(b)(3)(A), which requires the fee if the license has been suspended “within the 
10 years preceding the application.”622 The court held that the statute applies to the status 
of suspension and not the initial act of suspension.623 Affirming the lower court, the 
supreme court held that Alaska’s ten-year statute of limitations does not bar the Alaska 
DMV from charging a $100 statutory fee to reinstate the driver’s license of a person 
whose license suspension began over ten years prior to applying for reinstatement.624 
 
Farmer v. State  
In Farmer v. State,625 the supreme court held that judicial expungement of 
criminal records should only be an exceptional or extraordinary remedy.626 The FBI 
prevented Farmer, a convicted felon, from purchasing a gun.627 Farmer proceeded to file 
a pro se petition in superior court to expunge his record, arguing that ever since finishing 
probation “he has led an honest and upright life,” that he needed the gun for hunting and 
self defense, and that refusal to expunge would violate his Second Amendment 
“constitutional right to bear arms.”628 The superior court denied Farmer’s petition and 
held that there is no constitutionally protected right to purchase arms.629 Farmer appealed 
the denial and argued on appeal that the superior court prevented his motion for 
reconsideration of the court’s judgment.630 In declining to decide if Alaska courts possess 
the authority to expunge, the court found that even if it did, Farmer’s circumstances were 
not extraordinary; first, because Farmer failed to prove that his conviction and record 
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were unlawful or invalid, and second, because restricting felons’ ability to purchase 
firearms does not violate the limited Second Amendment right to bear arms.631 Finally, 
the court found that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when the superior court 
dismissed Farmer’s action with prejudice because absent Farmer’s filing a defective 
motion, there was no reason for the superior court to know Farmer needed guidance.632 
Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that judicial expungement of criminal 
records should only be an exceptional or extraordinary remedy.633 
 
Majaev v. State  
In Majaev v. State,634 the supreme court held that a peace officer’s simple hand 
signal directing an individual driver to stop, or come back to the officer, is a seizure when 
it would compel a reasonable individual not to leave.635 Majaev began to drive away from 
a turnout after an Alaska State Trooper pulled up next to Majaev’s truck.636 The trooper 
stepped out behind Majaev's truck then waved Majaev back and gave him a sobriety 
test.637 Majaev was charged with driving under the influence and moved to dismiss the 
charge, arguing that he was subjected to an unlawful seizure.638 The district court denied 
Majaev’s motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that a hand signal is not 
sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that he is not free to leave; thus, there 
was no seizure.639 The supreme court found that there is a seizure when an officer’s use 
of authority would cause an objectively reasonable individual to feel compelled to stay.640 
The Court reasoned that because section 28.35.182 of the Alaska Statute subjects persons 
to criminal penalties for failure to stop vehicles at the signal (including hand signals) or 
request of a peace officer, an objectively reasonable individual in Majaev’s position 
would have felt compelled to stay and follow the trooper’s instructions in order to avoid 
criminal penalty.641 Reversing the lower courts, the supreme court held that a peace 
officer’s simple hand signal directing an individual driver to stop, or come back to the 
officer, is a seizure when it would compel a reasonable individual not to leave.642            
 
Alaska Court of Appeals 
 
Alexie v. State 
 In Alexie v. State,643 the court of appeals held that first-time felony offenders 
convicted of first-degree assault under section 11.41.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes are 
subject to the sentencing range of 7 to 11 years specified in section 12.55.125(c)(2) of the 
                                                 
631 Id. at 1014–16.  
632 Id. at 1016–17. 
633 Id. at 1012–17.  
634 223 P.3d 629 (Alaska 2010). 
635 Id. at 632–34.  
636 Id. at 631. 
637 Id. 
638 Id. 
639 Id. 
640 Id. at 632. 
641 Id. at 633–34. 
642 Id. at 632–34. 
 
643 229 P.3d 217 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010). 
 46
Alaska Statutes.644 Alexie pled no contest to first-degree assault under section 
11.41.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes, which involved recklessly causing serious 
physical injury to another using a dangerous instrument.645 The superior court sentenced 
Alexie under section 12.55.125(c) of the Alaska Statutes; subsection (2) of the statute 
stated that if the defendant caused serious physical injury or death during the offense then 
the presumptive sentencing range is 7 to 11 years.646 The supreme court had interpreted a 
previous version of the sentencing statute not to provide a shorter sentence for reckless 
manslaughter than reckless assault.647 Alexie challenged the current statute using similar 
reasoning as the challenge to the earlier statute—that it was illogical for the legislature to 
provide the same punishment for reckless manslaughter and reckless assault.648 The court 
of appeals affirmed the superior court’s sentence, reasoning that it was the province of 
the legislature, not the judiciary, to set the sentencing guidelines.649 The court of appeals 
held that first-time felony offenders convicted of first-degree assault under section 
11.41.200(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes are subject to the sentencing range of 7 to 11 years 
specified in section 12.55.125(c)(2) of the Alaska Statutes.650 
 
Borchgrevink v. State 
In Borchgrevink v. State,651 the court of appeals held that “first complaint” 
evidence is admissible and may include a victim’s identification of the perpetrator only if 
the victim testifies at the defendant’s trial.652 Borchgrevink was convicted of first-degree 
assault and for a merged count of first-degree sexual assault and first-degree sexual abuse 
of a minor.653  During a medical examination for injuries to her head and genitals, E.P., 
the minor-victim, identified Borchgrevink as her assailant.654 Before the trial the superior 
court judge ruled that E.P.’s identification of Borchgrevink during the “first complaint” 
would be allowed at trial; but when E.P. took the stand, Borchgrevink’s attorney had E.P. 
declared incompetent as a witness.655  Borchgrevink appealed his convictions claiming 
the “first complaint” evidence was improperly admitted in light of E.P.’s failure to 
testify.656  The court of appeals held that the superior court erred in admitting the “first 
complaint” identification information as evidence.657  While admitting E.P.’s “first 
complaint” testimony at trial was an error, because Borchgrevink did not object during 
trial to the admittance of the identification information, the court of appeals further held it 
was reasonable to assume Borchgrevink made a tactical decision not to object and 
therefore it was not a reversible error.658  Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals 
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held that while a trial judge has the discretion to redact identification information from 
“first complaint” testimony, such identification testimony is admissible only if the victim 
testifies at trial.659 
Cleveland v. State 
In Cleveland v. State,660 the court of appeals held: (1) an appellate decision 
becomes final when the time for filing a petition for hearing expires or the day after the 
Alaska Supreme Court denies a petition for hearing; and (2) the statute of limitations for 
filing for post conviction relief is not tolled while a motion to correct an illegal sentence 
is pending.661 Cleveland’s petition for a hearing on an assault conviction was denied by 
the supreme court in 2004.662 In 2007, Cleveland filed for post-conviction relief. The 
superior court granted the State’s motion to dismiss because the petition was untimely.663 
Cleveland appealed, arguing that because he had filed a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence in the superior court before the supreme court had denied his petition for 
hearing, the statute of limitations was tolled.664 The court of appeals first stated that 
section 12.72.020(a)(3) of the Alaska Statutes requires criminal defendants who were 
unnsuccessful on appeal to file for post-conviction relief within one year of the court of 
appeals’ final decision.665 The court then determined that an appellate decision becomes 
final either when the time for filing a petition for hearing expires or the day after Alaska 
Supreme Court denies a petition for hearing.666 Since the decision affirming Cleveland’s 
conviction became final when the Supreme Court denied his petition for hearing in 2004, 
his 2007 application for post conviction relief was untimely.667 The statute of limitations 
was not tolled while Cleveland’s motion to correct an illegal sentence was pending.668 
Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held: (1) an appellate decision becomes 
final when the time for filing a petition for hearing expires or the day after the Alaska 
Supreme Court denies a petition for hearing; and (2) the statute of limitations for filing 
for post conviction relief is not tolled while a motion to correct an illegal sentence is 
pending.669 
 
Deemer v. State 
 In Deemer v. State,670 the court of appeals held that when the police have probable 
cause to believe that physical evidence of a driver's identity is evidence of a crime, they 
may search the passenger compartment and places where one would reasonably expect to 
find that evidence.671 A state trooper stopped Deemer for a traffic violation.672 Deemer 
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lied to the trooper about her identity, but another trooper recognized Deemer and ran her 
name through the computer.673 The search revealed an outstanding warrant, so the 
troopers arrested Deemer then searched her car and found a handgun and cocaine.674 
Deemer challenged the search and the court of appeals initially found the search 
lawful.675 The United States Supreme Court later issued a decision altering federal search 
and seizure law and the Alaska Supreme Court ordered the court of appeals to reconsider 
Deemer’s case.676 Police have the authority to search a vehicle incident to an arrest if they 
have a reasonable belief that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in 
the vehicle.677 Because Deemer had just committed the offense of falsely identifying 
herself, the officers had the authority to search the vehicle for evidence of her 
identification.678 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that when the police 
have probable cause to believe that physical evidence of a driver's identity is evidence of 
a crime, they may search the passenger compartment and places where one would 
reasonably expect to find that evidence.679 
Evans v. State 
In Evans v. State,680 the court of appeals held that a defendant is entitled to a 
mistrial when the State discloses information mid-trial that should have been disclosed 
earlier and fails to prove that the late disclosure was not prejudicial to the defendant.681 
Evans was convicted of burglary, theft, and criminal mischief.682 On appeal, Evans 
argued that the trial judge should have declared a mistrial because the State waited until 
the middle of his trial to disclose exculpatory statements made by Evan’s co-defendant 
during a police interview.683 The court of appeals noted that the State was required to 
disclose the contents of the interview pursuant to Criminal Rules 16(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 
16(b)(3).684 Because the interview was not disclosed, Evans’s attorney had no reason to 
believe the interview contained exculpatory statements.685 After the interview statements 
were disclosed mid-trial, Evans’s co-defendant claimed privilege and would not testify as 
a witness.686 Consequently, the State failed to prove that its late disclosure was not 
prejudicial, and Evans was entitled to a mistrial.687 The court of appeals held that a 
defendant is entitled to a mistrial when the State discloses information mid-trial that 
should have been disclosed earlier and fails to prove that the late disclosure was not 
prejudicial to the defendant.688 
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Ferguson v. State 
 In Ferguson v. State,689 the court of appeals held that the failure of an attorney to 
adequately convey the implications of a plea agreement that a defendant accepts 
constitutes incomplete legal advice, and the defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea.690  
After consulting with his attorney, Ferguson accepted the State’s plea agreement under 
the assumption that four years of his seven-year term of imprisonment would be 
suspended.691 He also believed he would be eligible for good time credit against the 
three-year portion of the sentence that he would actually serve, so he would only have to 
serve two years.692  After realizing that he would not receive the good time credit, 
Ferguson filed petition for post-conviction relief based on incompetent legal advice 
concerning the plea agreement.693 On appeal, the court held that a defendant is entitled to 
withdraw a plea if: (1) the defendant was given incomplete advice concerning the nature 
of the sentence he would receive upon accepting a plea bargain; and (2) the defendant 
would not have entered into the plea bargain if he had received accurate advice.694 
Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals held that the failure of an attorney to 
adequately convey the implications of a plea agreement that a defendant accepts 
constitutes incomplete legal advice, and the defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea.695   
 
Guthrie v. State  
In Guthrie v. State,696 the court of appeals held that a jury cannot convict an 
individual for failure to appear unless the appearance is required and a defendant 
challenging a court’s denial to sever charges must show that joinder of the charges 
created a prejudice against him.697  Guthrie failed to attend a scheduled court proceeding 
regarding his upcoming assault trial.698  The State charged Guthrie with misdemeanor 
failure to appear and consolidated both charges.699  The court denied Guthrie’s request to 
sever the charges and the jury convicted Guthrie of both crimes.700  The court of appeals 
reversed, finding that under section 12.30.060 of the Alaska Statutes, a jury cannot 
convict an individual for failure to appear unless the state presents evidence that 
appearance is required.701  Here, the State presented no evidence proving that the trial 
judge imposed an obligation for Guthrie to appear.702  Additionally, the court of appeals 
declined to determine Guthrie’s severance request because Guthrie failed to present 
evidence showing that the joinder created any jury prejudice.703  Reversing in part and 
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affirming in part, the court of appeals held that a jury cannot convict an individual for 
failure to appear unless the appearance is required, and a defendant challenging a court’s 
denial to sever charges must show that joinder of the charges created a prejudice against 
him.704     
 
Lamkin v. State 
 In Lamkin v. State,705 the court of appeals held that sentencing judges may not 
suspend the imposition of sentence for a defendant convicted of felony assault.706 Lamkin 
pled guilty to one count of assault in the third degree.707 At his sentencing hearing, he 
argued that the court should suspend his sentence pursuant to section 12.55.125 of the 
Alaska Statutes, under which he was convicted.708 The superior court judge refused, 
citing section 12.55.085, which restricts a judge’s authority to suspend a sentence if the 
offender is convicted of certain crimes, including assault in the third degree.709 The court 
of appeals affirmed, resolving the apparently contradicting authority by using a rule of 
statutory construction that favors specific statutes to more general ones.710 Here, although 
the statute criminalizing Lamkin’s assault allows a judge to suspend the sentence of 
certain offenders, a more focused statute that deals primarily with suspension of sentence 
forbids the judge from doing so.711 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held 
that sentencing judges may not suspend the imposition of sentence for a defendant 
convicted of felony assault.712 
 
Lindoff v. State 
In Lindoff v. State,713 the court of appeals held that a defendant requesting to 
withdraw a previously-accepted plea of guilty or no contest by arguing that he was not 
advised on the consequences of the plea must, at a minimum, unequivocally assert that he 
would not have entered the plea had he had been told the consequences.714 Lindoff, who 
had already been convicted of a sex offense, was indicted for a second sex offense and 
agreed to plead guilty.715 Under Criminal Rule 11(c)(4), a judge must advise two-time 
sex offenders that they must register as sex offenders for life, but the judge did not do so 
in this case.716 Lindoff moved to withdraw his guilty plea because he had not been 
warned that he would be forced to register for life.717 After an evidentiary hearing, the 
superior court judge denied Lindoff’s motion.718 The court of appeals noted that when 
Lindoff was asked whether he would have pled guilty had he had known of the registry 
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requirement, he stated, “I do not know that I would have.”719 The court held that Lindoff 
bore the burden of producing evidence showing the judge’s violation of Rule 11(c) 
prejudiced him, and this equivocal assertion made Lindoff’s request to withdraw the plea 
insufficient as a matter of law.720 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that 
a defendant attempting to withdraw a previously-accepted plea of guilty or no contest by 
arguing that he was not advised of the consequences of the plea must, at a minimum, 
unequivocally assert that he would not have entered the plea had he had been told the 
consequences.721 
Linehan v. State 
In Linehan v. State,722 the court of appeals held that: (1) hearsay evidence of a 
murder victim’s statement evincing his state of mind before the murder is admissible only 
if it is relevant to proving something about the victim’s conduct that will be disputed at 
trial;723 and (2) testimony regarding a criminal defendant’s expression of admiration for a 
movie is not admissible unless there is a close nexus between the movie and the 
defendant that shows the testimony is being presented for a reason other than 
circumstantial evidence of bad character.724 Linehan was convicted of first-degree 
murder.725 On appeal, Linehan argued that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of 
a letter, written by the victim, asserting that Linehan had a split personality and that if the 
victim was killed, Linehan would likely be responsible.726 Linehan also argued that the 
trial court improperly admitted evidence of his admiration of a character in a movie.727 
On appeal, the court reasoned that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the letter 
because there was no dispute regarding any aspect of Leppink’s mental state or conduct 
that was alluded to in the letter.728 The court then held that because the case was based 
mostly on circumstantial evidence and the letter essentially contained an “accusation 
from the grave,” it was likely that the letter affected the verdict.729 The court also held 
that Alaska Rule of Evidence 404 barred testimony that Linehan admired the main 
character in the movie.730 The nexus between Linehan and the movie was not close 
enough for the evidence to have been anything more than impermissible circumstantial 
character evidence.731 Reversing the lower court, the court of appeals held that: (1) 
hearsay evidence of a murder victim’s statement evincing his state of mind before the 
murder is admissible only if it is relevant to proving something about the victim’s 
conduct that will be disputed at trial;732 and (2) testimony regarding a criminal 
defendant’s expression of admiration for a movie is not admissible unless there is a close 
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nexus between the movie and the defendant that shows the testimony is being presented 
for a reason other than circumstantial evidence of bad character.733 
 
Ulak v. State 
In Ulak v. State,734 the court of appeals held that unproven assertions in a 
presentence report must be removed.735 Ulak plead guilty to assault in the third degree for 
injuring C.S., a three-year old child, and admitted to aggravating factors, specifically that 
she manifested deliberate cruelty.736 After her sentencing, however, she denied that she 
ever injured C.S. and moved to strike her grandchildren’s hearsay statements that she 
deliberately injured C.S. from the presentence report.737 The superior court denied the 
motion but supplemented the record with Ulak’s version.738 On appeal, the court of 
appeals held that when a defendant denies hearsay assertions, the burden is on the State to 
present live testimony to support the assertions.739 The court noted that the superior court 
failed to explicitly make a determination of fact and that it was not sufficient to merely 
note disputed assertions in the presentence report.740 Remanding the case, the court of 
appeals held that unproven assertions in a presentence report must be removed.741 
 
West v. State 
 In West v. State,742 the court of appeals held that when a jury does not address a 
factor upon which a presumptive sentencing range hinges, and the factor is raised by the 
defense prior to sentencing, a new jury trial on that factor does not violate the double 
jeopardy clause.743 West was convicted of first-degree robbery following a jury trial.744 
Under Alaska’s sentencing law, West’s presumptive sentencing range depended on 
whether he personally possessed or used a firearm during the robbery.745 During the trial, 
that specific issue of fact was not asked to, or answered by the jury.746 After his 
conviction West challenged the jury instruction, arguing that he was entitled to have a 
jury decide whether he was personally armed during the robbery.747  The trial court 
granted the new trial, but West appealed, arguing that it would violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.748  The court of appeals reasoned that even if the jury instructions had 
omitted an essential element of the crime, West could not be acquitted under the double 
jeopardy clause.749  Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that when a jury 
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does not address a factor upon which a presumptive sentencing range hinges, and the 
factor is raised by the defense prior to sentencing, a new jury trial on that factor does not 
violate the double jeopardy clause.750   
ELECTION LAW 
top  
 
United States District Court for the District of Alaska 
 
Miller v. Treadwell  
In Miller v. Treadwell,751 the United States District Court for the District of 
Alaska held that: (1) counting ballots that misspell a candidate’s name does not violate 
the Elections Clause; and (2) the failure to create uniform rules for counting ballots does 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause when it is done uniformly by the same panel of 
officials.752 Miller filed claims contesting the results of the election for Lisa Murkowski’s 
U.S. Senate seat because she did not appear on the ballot but was declared the winner of 
the race after receiving enough write-in votes to defeat both Miller and the Democratic 
candidate.753 Miller claimed that counting the numerous write-in ballots for Murkowski 
that misspelled her name violated the Elections Clause of the Constitution because 
Alaska law requires voters write in the candidate name “as it appears on the write-in 
declaration of candidacy.”754 The district court agreed with the Alaska Supreme Court in 
rejecting this claim, stating that the intent of the voter was paramount.755 Next, citing 
Bush v. Gore, Miller claimed the Division of Elections’ failure to create “specific 
standards” and “uniform rules” for elections violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.756 The district court also rejected this claim, distinguishing the case 
from Bush because, though subjectivity was involved in accepting or rejecting the write-
in ballots, it was all done uniformly by the same panel of officials.757 Affirming the lower 
court, the United States District Court for the District of Alaska held that: (1) counting 
ballots that misspell a candidate’s name does not violate the Elections Clause; and (2) the 
failure to create uniform rules for counting ballots does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause when it is done uniformly by the same panel of officials.758 
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Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Apone v. Fred Meyer, Inc. 
In Apone v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,759 the supreme court held: (1) the Alaska Workers’ 
Compensation Board may recognize a worker’s expert witnesses while giving little 
weight to their testimony; and (2) while the Board’s duty to assist pro se litigants is 
similar to that of a court, the Board is not required to give guidance on strategy 
decisions.760 Apone, a Fred Meyer gas station attendant, sought workers’ compensation 
benefits for a physical illness he attributed to workplace exposure to gasoline fumes.761 
At a workers’ compensation hearing, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board allowed 
the testimony of Apone’s expert witnesses—a chiropractor with no certification in 
toxicology and an anti-toxins advocate who did not examine Apone or the work 
environment at Fred Meyer.762 However, the Board gave their testimony less weight than 
the testimony of the physician who conducted the employer’s independent medical 
evaluation (EIME).763 The Board determined that Apone had failed to prove his claim.764 
Apone appealed to the superior court, arguing that the Board did not adequately assist 
him in preparing his case and that the Board abused its discretion by not recognizing his 
expert witnesses.765 The superior court affirmed the Board’s decision, and Apone 
appealed to the supreme court.766 The supreme court held that it was reasonable for the 
Board to give less weight to Apone’s witnesses because Apone’s chiropractor did not 
have training specific to toxins and because the toxins expert was not a medical doctor 
capable of linking Apone’s illness to exposure at work.767 Additionally, because the 
EIME physician was specifically trained in toxicology, the court found it reasonable for 
the Board to rely more heavily on his testimony.768 The court also held that because 
medical testimony is not required in all workers’ compensation cases, whether to present 
a medical expert is a strategy decision.769 Therefore, the Board was not required to advise 
Apone, a pro se litigant, on the use of expert testimony.770 Affirming the superior court, 
the supreme court held: (1) the Board may recognize a worker’s expert witnesses while 
giving little weight to their testimony; and (2) pro se litigants are not entitled to guidance 
on strategy decisions from the Board.771 
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Burke v. Houston NANA, L.L.C. 
 In Burke v. Houston NANA, L.L.C.,772 the supreme court held: (1) when an 
employee is already receiving temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, the burden is on 
the employer to show that the employee is no longer disabled;773 and (2) denial of 
reimbursement for travel costs to a workers’ compensation hearing is an abuse of agency 
discretion when the employee was unable to know in advance whether his credibility 
would be an issue and his attendance necessary.774 Burke, an employee of Houston 
NANA, L.L.C., was injured while working as a pipe fitter on the Alaska pipeline.775 The 
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board denied certain portions of Burke’s claim for 
medical and disability benefits, and Burke contested the denials.776 The superior court 
affirmed the Board’s decision, and Burke appealed.777 The supreme court held that since 
Burke was already receiving TTD benefits, there was a presumption of disability that 
Houston NANA had the burden to disprove.778 Since Houston NANA did not provide 
substantial evidence to rebut the presumption, the Board erred in denying Burke’s request 
for TTD benefits.779 The court also held that the Board abused its discretion by denying 
Burke’s travel costs to attend his workers’ compensation hearing because he did not 
know prior to the hearing whether his credibility would be an issue.780 Reversing in part 
the superior court, the supreme court held: (1) when an employee is already receiving 
TTD benefits, the burden is on the employer to show that the employee is no longer 
disabled;781 and (2) denial of reimbursement for travel costs to a workers’ compensation 
hearing is an abuse of agency discretion when the employee was unable to know in 
advance whether his credibility would be an issue and his attendance necessary.782 
 
Okpik v. City of Barrow  
In Okpik v. City of Barrow,783 the supreme court held that a former employee’s 
wrongful termination claim can survive summary judgment when she presents admissible 
evidence disputing the justification for her demotion that is sufficient to raise an issue of 
material fact regarding whether the employer violated its implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.784 The city of Barrow overpaid Mayor Nathaniel Olemaun.785 Both 
Mayor Olemaun and finance director Lucy Okpik knew about the overpayment.786 
Olemaun demoted Okpik and the day after her demotion Okpik resigned.787 Okpik 
brought suit alleging she was demoted in retaliation for her role in Olemaun’s 
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overpayment.788 The superior court granted Barrow’s motion for summary judgment and 
Okpik appealed the court’s summary judgment on her due process, whistleblower and 
wrongful termination claims.789 The supreme court affirmed summary judgment on the 
due process and whistleblower claims but reversed the wrongful termination claim, 
finding that a breach of “the implied covenant of good faith,” along with actual 
termination, will support a wrongful conviction claim.790 The supreme court found that 
Okpik’s rebuttal of some of the reasons for her demotion, her presentation of positive 
employment evaluations, and evidence that Olemaun was personnel director, was 
sufficient to create an issue of material fact regarding whether Barrow breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and demoted Okpik for reasons other than her 
performance and Olemaun’s overpayment.791 Thus, the supreme court held that a former 
employee’s wrongful termination claim can survive summary judgment when she 
presents admissible evidence disputing the justification for her demotion that is sufficient 
to raise an issue of material fact regarding whether the employer violated its implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.792 
 
Peterson v. State, Department of Natural Resources 
In Peterson v. State, Department of Natural Resources,793 the supreme court held 
that (1) review of a summary judgment should be based only on information available to 
the lower court;794 (2) an employer does not breach the implied covenant of good faith 
when its employment decisions were made in good faith;795 (3) a discrimination claim 
fails if the employee cannot demonstrate that his employer’s justifications for its decision 
are merely pretext;796 and, (4) a hostile work environment claim requires evidence of 
persistent and abusive conduct.797 An employee claimed his employer breached its 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by withdrawing his firefighting 
qualifications.798 The employee claimed that the employer discriminated against him 
when it gave a position he had applied to someone else,799 and created a hostile work 
environment because other employees made demeaning comments about him.800 The 
superior court granted summary judgment against the employee.801 The employee then 
submitted additional information to be considered by the supreme court.802 The supreme 
court refused to consider the additional information, concluding that it would only review 
information available to the lower court.803 The court found no breach of the employment 
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contract because the decision to withdraw the employee’s qualifications had been made 
by a good faith reliance on the available evidence about his professional conduct.804 The 
court determined that the discrimination claim failed because he could not show that the 
non-discriminatory justifications the employer cited for its employment decision were 
mere pretext.805 Finally, the supreme court rejected the employee’s hostile work 
environment claims because the comments at issue were too ambiguous, isolated, and 
inoffensive to produce a hostile environment.806  The supreme court affirmed, holding 
that (1) review of a summary judgment should be based only on information available to 
the lower court;807 (2) an employer does not breach the implied covenant of good faith 
when its employment decisions were made in good faith;808 (3) a discrimination claim 
fails if the employee cannot demonstrate that his employer’s justifications for its decision 
are merely pretext;809 and, (4) a hostile work environment claim requires evidence of 
persistent and abusive conduct.810 
 
Shehata v. Salvation Army 
In Shehata v. Salvation Army,811 the supreme court held that in workers’ 
compensation cases, employees can only be forced to repay benefits obtained via fraud 
when the fraud directly led to the procurement of the benefits.812 Shehata injured his 
shoulder while working for the Salvation Army and received disability benefits.813 
Without notifying the Salvation Army, Shehata began working part-time for pay.814 
When the Salvation Army confronted Shehata about the job, he denied that he was being 
paid.815 The Salvation Army petitioned the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board for 
reimbursement of benefits pursuant to section 23.30.250(b) of the Alaska Statutes, which 
permits the Board to order repayment of fraudulently earned benefits.816 The Board ruled 
that Shehata lied and was required to repay all of the disability benefits he received as 
well as more than $14,500 in attorneys’ fees.817 Shehata immediately appealed to the 
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission, but the commission affirmed the 
decision and further awarded the Salvation Army over $5200 in additional attorneys’ fees 
because Shehata’s appeal was “frivolous.”818 The supreme court agreed with the 
Commission that employers are entitled to reimbursement of benefits gained via fraud, 
and also agreed that the employers need not fully prove all elements of common law 
fraud to be repaid.819 However, the court held that Shehata’s misrepresentation did not 
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directly cause him to receive benefits, as the false statement came more than a month 
after he began receiving disability payments.820 Additionally, the court held that 
Shehata’s appeal was not frivolous because it was brought in good faith and material 
questions of law and fact remained.821 Therefore, the court overturned the attorneys’ fees 
awarded for the appeal and the repayment of any benefits received prior to the fraud.822 
Reversing in part, the supreme court held that in workers’ compensation cases, 
employees can only be forced to repay benefits obtained via fraud when the fraud directly 
led to the procurement of the benefits.823 
 
Smith v. Anchorage School District 
In Smith v. Anchorage School District,824 the supreme court held that terminated 
employees must offer sufficient material evidence to prove claims of employment 
discrimination and breach of the convent of good faith and fair dealing against the school 
district where they were employed.825 The Anchorage School District terminated Smith 
from his security position and he sued claiming race, age, and disability discrimination as 
well as breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.826 The supreme court held 
summary judgment was proper on all claims because Smith failed to present any 
evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.827 Affirming the lower court decision, 
the supreme court held that terminated employees must offer sufficient material evidence 
to prove claims of employment discrimination and breach of the convent of good faith 
and fair dealing against the school district where they were employed.828 
 
State v. Public Safety Employees Association 
In State v. Public Safety Employees Association,829 the supreme court held that 
arbitrators’ decisions are entitled to substantial deference when parties bargain for a 
binding arbitration agreement, even if the court would have reached a different 
outcome.830 After a Department of Transportation officer was terminated because of 
inappropriate comments he made while intoxicated, the Public Safety Employees 
Association (“PSEA”) filed a grievance with the State that went to arbitration.831 The 
arbitrator determined that mitigating factors made termination excessive, and he ordered 
the Department to reinstate the officer without back pay.832 The State appealed to the 
superior court, which granted summary judgment to PSEA.833 The supreme court 
affirmed, holding that the arbitrator’s decision was entitled to deference because the State 
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failed to show the arbitrator had committed gross error.834 Affirming the lower court, the 
supreme court held that arbitrators’ decisions are entitled to substantial deference when 
parties bargain for a binding arbitration agreement, even if the court would have reached 
a different outcome.835 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Court of Appeals 
 
Charles v. State 
 In Charles v. State,836 the court of appeals held that a defendant was not entitled 
to raise a subsistence defense after violating regulations that require hunters to have 
harvest tickets, and that for a state regulation to be inconsistent with federal law there 
must be some deficiency in the administrative proceedings or the regulation must have 
been arbitrary or unreasonable.837 The superior court convicted Charles for unlawful 
possession and transportation of game and hunting without the required harvest tickets 
for his involvement in a situation where deer were shot on federal land on Prince Wales 
Island.838 Charles argued that the subsistence priority found in the Alaska National 
Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA) entitled him to defend against the 
charges by claiming the hunting was needed for subsistence.839 The court determined that 
Charles was not entitled to raise a subsistence defense because, without a regulation 
authorizing subsistence hunting, he had no right to violate the current regulations.840 
Charles also argued that the current state regulations conflicted with the ANILCA and the 
state regulations were therefore invalid.841  Charles' hunting of does, however, violated 
both federal and state regulations, which weighs against a conflict.842 Further, Charles 
provided no record of deficiencies in the administrative proceedings that developed the 
regulations or that the regulations were arbitrary and unreasonable when enacted, which 
would be required to challenge the regulations.843  Affirming the lower court, the court of 
appeals held that a defendant was not entitled to raise a subsistence defense after 
violating regulations that require hunters to have harvest tickets, and that for a state 
regulation to be inconsistent with federal law there must be some deficiency in the 
administrative proceedings or the regulation must have been arbitrary or unreasonable.844 
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ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
top  
 
Stewart v. Elliott 
 In Stewart v. Elliott,845 the supreme court held that when a driver’s attorney in a 
criminal action is not a party to the post-conviction relief action and neither directed nor 
controlled that litigation, the post-conviction relief decision does not have preclusive 
effect in a malpractice action.846  A driver was arrested for a felony driving under the 
influence (DUI) on the day a new DUI law took effect.847  The driver pleaded no contest 
to the DUI charge in exchange for a reduction from a felony to a misdemeanor.848  The 
superior court later granted the driver post-conviction relief, concluding his counsel was 
ineffective in failing to recognize that the new DUI law became effective at the time of 
the arrest.849  The driver brought a malpractice suit against the attorney, relying on the 
decision in the post-conviction relief action to demonstrate the attorney did not recognize 
the date discrepancy.850  The superior court declined to give the post-conviction decision 
preclusive effect and ruled that the driver presented insufficient evidence to prove 
negligence.851  The supreme court agreed, holding there was no privity for the defendant 
attorney with the prior decision, and there was insufficient evidence to prove a breach of 
attorney duty.852 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that when a driver’s 
attorney in a criminal action is not a party to the post-conviction relief action and neither 
directed nor controlled that litigation, the post-conviction relief decision does not have 
preclusive effect in a malpractice action.853   
 
FAMILY LAW 
top  
 
Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Barbara P. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services 
 In Barbara P. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,854 the supreme 
court determined that a finding that a parent has not remedied the conduct or conditions 
that places his or her child at risk is a question of fact that will only be reviewed for clear 
error.855 The Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) filed a petition to terminate 
Barbara’s parental rights and the father’s parental rights to their two children.856 The 
superior court terminated both parents’ parental rights because both children were in need 
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of aid857 due to: (1) domestic violence by both parents, substance abuse by both parents, 
Barbara’s mental health issues, and abandonment by the father, (2) the parents’ failure to 
remedy the conduct and conditions that placed the children at risk of harm, and (3) OCS 
made reasonable efforts to provide services to reunite the family.858 The supreme court 
held that determinations of whether or not a parent has remedied conduct that places a 
child at risk is best determined by a trial court and will be reviewed for clear error.859 The 
supreme court then found that the superior court’s findings were adequately supported by 
the record.860 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court determined that a finding that 
a parent has not remedied the conduct or conditions that places his or her child at risk is a 
question of fact that will only be reviewed for clear error.861 
 
Barnett v. Barnett  
In Barnett v. Barnett,862 the supreme court held that courtship costs do not qualify 
as marital debt under Alaska law for purposes of calculating spousal support, and that 
immigration sponsorship pledges are not actionable for support under federal law.863 Mr. 
Bennett paid for his courtship visits and the entire costs of Mrs. Bennett’s pre-marital 
move from Belarus to Fairbanks.864 These expenses included the filing of immigration 
paperwork for Mrs. Bennett and her daughter, in which Mr. Bennett pledged to be their 
sponsor and to support them.865 After Mr. Bennett filed for divorce, Mrs. Bennett 
requested spousal support and attorneys’ fees under both state and federal law, 
contending that the immigration sponsor pledge required Mr. Bennett to support her for 
ten years after her entry into the country.866 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the 
superior court’s award of no support under federal law, but remanded the state law 
spousal support question.867 The supreme court found that the superior court had 
improperly treated Mr. Bennett’s “courtship costs” as “marital debt” that reduced the 
state law spousal support award and therefore remanded for reconsideration of Mrs. 
Bennett’s monthly spousal support and for more factual findings regarding her earning 
capacity and educational expenses.868 The supreme court held that courtship costs do not 
qualify as marital debt under Alaska law for purposes of calculating spousal support, and 
that immigration sponsorship pledges are not actionable for support under federal law.869 
 
Brotherton v. Warner 
 In Brotherton v. Warner,870 the supreme court held that superior courts may order 
child custody payments beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday, even if the parents have 
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designated another person to care for the child.871 Brotherton was ordered to pay child 
custody payments under section 25.24.170(a) of the Alaska Statutes after his child turned 
eighteen.872 On appeal, he argued that the statute did not apply to him because his child’s 
caretakers were not parents, guardians, or designees.873 He argued that the caretakers may 
have been designees before the child turned eighteen, they could no longer be considered 
designees because after turning eighteen his child could not be subject to the legal 
custody of another person.874 The supreme court noted that the statute was enacted to 
protect children who were still in high school when they turned eighteen; the court noted 
that Brotherton’s interpretation would render the statute meaningless.875 The supreme 
court held that superior courts may order child custody payments beyond the child’s 
eighteenth birthday, even if the parents have designated another person to care for the 
child.876 
 
Cartee v. Cartee 
In Cartee v. Cartee,877 the supreme court held that a 60/40 property division was 
not an abuse of discretion and that property awards made to facilitate career training 
should be analyzed under the property division statute and not under the rehabilitative 
alimony standard.878 In a divorce action, the husband appealed the trial court’s award of 
sixty percent of the marital property to his former wife, arguing in part that the court had 
improperly awarded rehabilitative alimony.879 While there is a presumption that an equal 
division of marital property is equitable, section 25.24.106(a)(4) of the Alaska Statutes 
allows for an unequal property division if a court, after taking into consideration the 
“Merrill factors,” determines that an unequal property division would fairly allocate the 
economic effects of divorce.880 The standard for determining rehabilitative alimony is 
narrower than for property division and serve the specific purpose of funding a spouse’s 
education or job training.881 Here, because the wife sacrificed career advancement to care 
for the couple’s child, the court gave her a greater percentage of the marital property.882 
Because the allocation did not require the wife to return to school but rather provided the 
opportunity, the more general property division was held to be the appropriate standard 
rather than the more rigid rehabilitative alimony standard.883 The supreme court affirmed 
the trial court decision, holding that a 60/40 property division was not an abuse of 
discretion and that property awards made to facilitate career training should be analyzed 
under the property division statute and not under the rehabilitative alimony standard.884 
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Charles v. State 
In Charles v. State,885 the supreme court held that it was appropriate to terminate 
parental rights where the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made active efforts to 
prevent the break-up of an Alaska Native family and where returning the children to the 
parent’s custody would result in harm to the children.886 To terminate parental rights, the 
court must find that active efforts were made to rehabilitate the parent and keep the 
family intact.887 The trial court determined that OCS’s repeated referrals of Charles to 
substance abuse and anger management programs, scheduling of visitation with his 
children, provision of bus passes and phone cards, and creation of a personalized case 
plan were sufficient to meet this standard.888 Termination of rights also requires a 
showing, including testimony by an expert witness, that returning the children to the 
parent’s care would likely result in “serious emotional or physical damage” to the 
children.889 Charles disputed the testimony provided by the expert in his trial, claiming 
that it was based only on generalizations.890 The trial court disagreed.891 Affirming the 
lower court, the supreme court held that it was appropriate to terminate parental rights 
where OCS made active efforts to prevent the break-up of an Alaska Native family and 
where returning the children to the parent’s custody would result in harm to the 
children.892 
 
Colton v. Colton 
 In Colton v. Colton,893 the supreme court held that, when dividing property in a 
divorce proceeding, the court should employ contract law principles that unexpressed 
intentions and mental reservations do not override objective indications of assent to terms 
of an agreement.894  This case arose out of a divorce proceeding in which the parties 
reached an agreement on all property division issues.895  The trial court entered into the 
record that the husband was to make a cash payment to his wife.896  The husband 
appealed, arguing (1) the superior court erred in finding the husband agreed to make this 
payment to his wife because he did not understand it would result in unequal property 
division, and (2) the superior court abused its discretion in enforcing this agreement 
because it was made without the husband’s full understanding.897  The supreme court 
held that all objective evidence pointed against the husband’s assent being contingent on 
an “equal” division and therefore the lower court did not err in enforcing the 
agreement.898  Affirming the judgment of the trial court, the supreme court held that, 
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when dividing property in a divorce proceeding, the court should employ contract law 
principles that unexpressed intentions and mental reservations do not override objective 
indications of assent to terms of an agreement.899   
 
Doug Y. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Doug Y. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,900 the supreme court held 
that an Office of Children’s Services (OCS) petition to terminate parental rights should 
be granted when a parent fails to change behavior that put his child at risk despite 
receiving adequate time and reasonable family services.901 First in 2005, and then in 
2007, OCS was called to investigate Doug Y. for beating his son, Damien.902 OCS 
created a case plan for Doug with the goal of allowing him to regain custody.903 In 2009, 
due to Doug’s failure to fully comply with the plan and Damien’s continuing trauma, the 
superior court granted a termination of Doug’s parental rights.904 Doug appealed, arguing 
that Damien was not a child in need of aid due to Doug’s substance abuse, OCS did not 
prove that Doug failed to change his harmful behavior, OCS failed to make a reasonable 
effort to provide Doug with family support services, and terminating Doug’s parental 
rights was not in Damien’s best interest.905 The supreme court first held that a finding that 
a child is in need of aid for any of the reasons in section 47.10.011 of the Alaska Statutes 
is sufficient to support termination.  Since Doug conceded physically harming Damien, 
his substance abuse was irrelevant.906  Next, the court applied the factors listed in section 
47.10.088(b) and found that Doug did not remedy the behavior that put Damien at risk 
for substantial harm.907 Finally, the court found that OCS provided adequate family 
support services, despite not hiring a counselor for Doug, and that  the superior court was 
justified in finding termination of Doug’s rights to be in Damien’s best interest.908 
Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that an OCS petition to terminate 
parental rights should be granted when a parent fails to change behavior that put his child 
at risk despite receiving adequate time and reasonable family services.909 
 
Hill v. Bloom 
 In Hill v. Bloom,910 the supreme court held that five months of income data was 
not sufficient to qualify as new evidence requiring the modification of child support and 
that, even if the data did qualify, it was not sufficient to show a material and permanent 
change in circumstances.911 The superior court calculated Hill’s child support payments 
to Bloom based on a five-year average of Hill’s income from her business, excluding 
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dramatically lower income from 2007, which the court found an “aberration.”912 Later, 
Hill filed a motion to modify child support, arguing that business changes depressed her 
earnings during the first six months of 2008 and her income would be dramatically less 
than anticipated.913 The court found that concerns over prompt modification of payments 
must be balanced with the need to let sufficient time pass to prove a change in income.914 
Here, the superior court averaged income over five years and only five months had 
passed since the decision.915 Because small businesses are prone to dramatic fluctuations, 
the supreme court held that it was not error to deny Hill’s motion for child support 
modification without an evidentiary hearing.916 The supreme court affirmed the superior 
court’s denial of Hill’s motion to modify child support without an evidentiary hearing, 
finding that five months of income data was not sufficient to qualify as new evidence 
requiring the modification of child support and that, even if the data were considered new 
evidence, it was not sufficient to show a material and permanent change in 
circumstances.917 
 
Husseini v. Husseini 
In Husseini v. Husseini,918 the supreme court held: (1) a divorce decree dissolving 
a marriage is a final judgment even when some issues have been reserved;919 and (2) in 
the absence of exceptional circumstances, it is error for a trial court to sell marital assets 
prior to issuing a divorce judgment.920 After separating from her husband, Janice 
continued to occupy the marital residence.921 At a hearing held before the divorce was 
finalized, the trial court gave Janice thirty days to refinance the home in her name and, 
against her objections, bifurcated the divorce from the property proceedings.922 Janice 
was unable to refinance, so the court ordered the sale of the house.923 Janice appealed, 
arguing the trial court erred in bifurcating the divorce proceedings and in ordering the 
sale of the home prior to a final judgment on property division.924 The supreme court held 
that Janice’s appeal of the bifurcation was untimely and a divorce decree is a final 
judgment even when some issues have been reserved.925 Because that rule had not been 
announced prior to this decision, the supreme court considered the merits of Janice’s 
claim.926 The supreme court determined that the trial court committed harmless error in 
bifurcating the divorce proceedings but erred in ordering the pre-judgment sale of the 
house because it did not make factual findings showing a pressing reason for the sale.927 
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Vacating and remanding, the court held: (1) a divorce decree dissolving a marriage is a 
final judgment even when some issues have been reserved;928 and (2) in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances, it is error for a trial court to sell marital assets prior to issuing 
a divorce judgment.929  
 
Kent V. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Kent V. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,930 the supreme court 
held that the state’s second petition to terminate a father’s parental rights was not barred 
by the doctrine of res judicata because the state raised new material facts.931  The 
defendant appealed the superior court’s decision to allow the state to relitigate its parental 
rights termination case after a prior holding that termination of parental rights was not 
necessary.932  The court held that new psychological evidence, which suggested the child 
would not be able to develop properly if he were kept with his parents, was a new 
material fact, and that the state’s second petition therefore was not barred by res 
judicata.933  Thus, the supreme court held that the state’s second petition to terminate a 
father’s parental rights was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the state 
raised new material facts.934    
 
Millette v. Millette 
 In Millette v. Millette,935 the supreme court held that the cost of nutritional 
supplements recommended by a physician and purchased from a clinic are reasonable 
health care expenses for reimbursement pursuant to a child support order.936  Pursuant to 
a child support order requiring payment for cost of natural health care, the divorced 
mother of an autistic child sought reimbursement from her ex-husband for nutritional 
supplements that were recommended to her by a health care practitioner.937 The superior 
court ordered the ex-husband to pay for the nutritional supplements.938  On appeal, the 
ex-husband argued that he should not have to pay these expenses because the 
supplements are part of the child’s nutritional expenses, not health care expenses.939  The 
supreme court reasoned, however, that the cost of these nutritional supplements could be 
considered health care expenses because the nutritional supplements had been purchased 
directly from a clinic, the invoices for the supplements also contained charges for 
appointments, and the supreme court has consistently interpreted “health expenses” for 
child support broadly.940  Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the cost 
                                                 
928 Id. at 686. 
929 Id. at 688. 
930 233 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2010). 
931 Id. at 602–03. 
932 Id. at 597. 
933 Id. at 602–03. 
934 Id. at 602–03. 
935 240 P.3d 1217 (Alaska 2010). 
936 Id. at 1225. 
937 Id. at 1219. 
938 Id. 
939 Id. at 1220. 
940 Id. at 1221. 
 67
of nutritional supplements recommended by a physician and purchased from a clinic are 
reasonable health care expenses for reimbursement pursuant to a child support order.941 
 
Misyura v. Misyura 
 In Misyura v. Misyura,942 the supreme court held: (1) is not an abuse of discretion 
for a trial court to find a history of domestic violence based solely on the testimony of a 
the battered spouse; and (2) a trial court errs by allowing a spouse to condition continued 
visitation rights on participation in an intervention program.943 Lyudmila Misyura 
obtained a domestic violence protective order against her husband, Sergey Misyura, after 
testifying of two separate instances of abuse.944 During the divorce proceeding, she 
testified about many other instances of domestic violence that occurred during the 
marriage.945 The trial court found a history of domestic violence, awarded sole legal and 
physical child custody to Lyudmila, and ordered that Lyudmila could require Sergey to 
attend an intervention program as a prerequisite to exercising his unsupervised visitation 
rights.946 The trial court had discretion to determine the credibility of the plaintiff’s 
testimony, even without any corroborating evidence or witnesses.947 The court, not a 
spouse, decides whether a party must attend an intervention program to maintain 
visitation rights.948 Affirming in part and reversing in part, the supreme court held: (1) is 
not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to find a history of domestic violence based 
solely on the testimony of a the battered spouse; and (2) a trial court errs by allowing a 
spouse to condition continued visitation rights on participation in an intervention 
program.949 
 
Osterkamp v. Stiles (I) 
 In Osterkamp v. Stiles,950 the supreme court held that in determining whether a 
foster parent has established psychological parent status, a court may rely on the short 
length of the parent-child relationship, the child's young age, and the fact that the foster 
parent allowed somebody else to adopt the child.951 Osterkamp and Stiles were foster 
parents for a child until Stiles adopted the child when he was sixteen months old.952 The 
two domestic partners separated after the adoption.953 Stiles began limiting Osterkamp’s 
custody and visitation and he filed a complaint, asking for custody and visitation.954 The 
superior court awarded sole physical and legal custody to Stiles and Osterkamp 
appealed.955 The supreme court determined that for Osterkamp to establish custody 
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despite Stiles’s objections, he would have to first prove that he was the child’s 
psychological parent at the time of the custody application by clear and convincing 
evidence.956 Since the relevant time period for determining the relationship was so short, 
the child was so young, and Osterkamp voluntarily allowed Stiles to adopt the child by 
herself, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision that psychological parent 
status was not established.957 Affirming the superior court’s ruling, the supreme court 
held that in determining whether a foster parent has established psychological parent 
status, a court may rely on the short length of the parent-child relationship, the child's 
young age, and the fact that the foster parent allowed somebody else to adopt the child.958   
 
Osterkamp v. Stiles (II) 
In Osterkamp v. Stiles,959 the supreme court held that an adoptive mother could 
not be equitably estopped from withholding consent for her partner to adopt her child 
when she never unconditionally agreed to allow the adoption.960 Stiles adopted a foster 
child that she and Osterkamp had raised for sixteen months.961 At the adoption hearing 
Osterkamp did not object to Stiles adopting the child individually and did not request 
post-adoption rights.962 Osterkamp and Stiles originally agreed that Osterkamp’s adoption 
of the child was dependent upon an improvement in their relationship.963 After the couple 
separated, Osterkamp filed for joint custody; the superior court denied because 
Osterkamp had proved neither psychological parent status nor that denying custody 
would be detrimental to the child.964 Osterkamp then filed a petition for adoption.965 In 
response to Stiles’ motion to dismiss, Osterkamp argued that Stiles could be equitably 
estopped from withholding consent.966 The superior court judge allowed that equitable 
estoppel might sometimes be applicable but found that the evidence did not support the 
claim and Osterkamp appealed.967 The supreme court did not decide whether equitable 
estoppel might apply in some petitions for adoption, but explained that reasonable 
reliance and resulting prejudice are generally required for equitable estoppel.968 Thus, the 
supreme court held that an adoptive mother could not be equitably estopped from 
withholding consent for her partner to adopt her child when she never unconditionally 
agreed to allow the adoption.969 
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Partridge v. Partridge 
 In Partridge v. Partridge,970 the supreme court held that a lower court’s fair 
evaluation of the economic effect of a divorce is a three-step process reviewable under 
the abuse of discretion standard.971 During the divorce proceedings, the trial court 
determined that an even division of assets at the legal date of separation was 
appropriate.972  James Partridge challenged the court’s allocation of assets claiming the 
court mischaracterized assets and failed to consider his contributions of separate property 
to the marriage.973  The supreme court articulated a three-step property division test to be 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard as: (1) the characterization of property as 
separate or marital; (2) the value placed upon the property; and (3) the allocation of 
property as equitable.974 The supreme court found that not crediting James for marital 
debt he paid and a failure to determine the existence of pension funds at the time of trial 
were an abuse of discretion, and all other evaluations by the trial court were neither 
clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion.975  The supreme court reversed and 
remanded, holding that a lower court’s fair evaluation of the economic effect of a divorce 
is a three-step process reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard.976 
 
Sparks v. Sparks 
 In Sparks v. Sparks,977 the supreme court held that proceeds from a court 
settlement are marital property when the evidence shows an intent to donate the disputed 
portion of the settlement proceeds to the marital estate.978 Shelia Sparks retired early due 
to a disability and sued her disability insurance carrier for discontinuing payments; she 
settled the case in 2004.979 A portion of the settlement provided monthly payments for 
Shelia and Richard Sparks that would continue in reduced payments if Shelia 
predeceased Richard.980 The supreme court reasoned that the inclusion of Richard Sparks 
as a payee in the settlement and the continuation of payments to him if Shelia died 
demonstrated an intent to donate those settlement payments to the marriage.981 The 
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s holding that damage payments replacing 
long-term disability payments which served as retirement benefits should be divided 
based on the length of the marriage982 and that the superior court did not clearly err in 
finding an intent to donate damages when the settlement listed the husband as a payee.983 
Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that proceeds from a court settlement 
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are marital property when the evidence shows an intent to donate the disputed portion of 
the settlement proceeds to the marital estate.984 
 
Wee v. Eggener 
In Wee v. Eggener,985 the supreme court held that: (1) a trial court errs when it awards 
joint custody and fails to address a presumption against custody for a party with a history 
of domestic violence; and (2) an independent basis must exist with respect to each party 
when a mutual restraining order is ordered.986 The domestic relationship between Wee 
and Eggener was plagued by abuse allegations by Wee, which resulted in a protective 
order being issued against Eggener.987 Eggener and Wee both filed for sole legal and 
primary physical custody of their child, and the trial court ordered joint physical custody 
and granted a mutual no contact order.988 The supreme court denied custody to Eggener 
because the trial court found that Eggener had a history of domestic violence, but did not 
address a statutory rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent who has 
a history of domestic violence.989 Further, the court vacated the no-contact order as it 
applied to Wee because no independent basis existed for a no-contact order against 
Wee.990 Vacating the lower court, the supreme court held that: (1) a trial court errs when 
it awards joint custody and fails to address a presumption against custody for a party with 
a history of domestic violence; and (2) an independent basis must exist with respect to 
each party when a mutual restraining order is ordered.991 
 
Williams v. Barbee 
In Williams v. Barbee,992 the supreme court held that, when allegations of 
domestic violence arise in custody hearings, the superior court must make a finding as to 
whether there has been a “history of domestic violence” under section 25.24.150(h) of the 
Alaska Statutes.993 During a custody hearing, Williams presented evidence that Barbee 
had been convicted of assaulting her while they were married.994  The trial court weighed 
this evidence against other factors and granted both parents joint custody.995 On appeal, 
Williams argued that Barbee should not have been granted custody because he had a 
history of domestic violence and section 25.24.150(h) creates a rebuttable presumption 
against the violent parent.996 The supreme court noted that a single instance of domestic 
violence can be considered a “history of domestic violence” for purposes of the statute.997 
It also noted that the superior court had not made a finding as to whether there was a 
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history of domestic violence.998  The supreme court held that, when allegations of 
domestic violence arise in custody hearings, the superior court must make a finding as to 
whether there has been a “history of domestic violence” under section 25.24.150(h) of the 
Alaska Statutes.999   
 
Worland v. Worland 
In Worland v. Worland,1000 the supreme court held: (1) courts may not equitably 
divide total retirement pay; and (2) when issuing sanctions courts must identify either the 
nature of the sanction or the rule upon which they relied to impose the sanction.1001 
Jacqueline Worland filed for divorce against her former husband, Charles.1002 The 
superior court entered an amended divorce decree assigning Jacqueline 50% of Charles’s 
gross military retirement pay as a sanction for him removing Jacqueline from the survivor 
benefits plan.1003 On appeal, Charles argued that the court erred in awarding Jacqueline 
50% of his gross retirement pay and that he was sanctioned erroneously.1004 The supreme 
court held that “a court may not equitably divide total retired pay; it may equitably divide 
only the amount of retired pay remaining after the court deducts waived retired pay and 
the cost of purchasing survivor benefits.”1005 As for the possibility that dividing the total 
retirement pay was a sanction against Charles, the court held that while trial courts have 
the authority to sanction through the use of fines, they must identify either the nature of 
the sanction or the rule upon which it relied.1006 Because the superior court did neither, 
the supreme court vacated the sanction.1007 Remanding the issue of the proper allocation 
of Charles’s retirement pay, the supreme court held: (1) courts may not equitably divide 
total retirement pay; and (2) when issuing sanctions courts must identify either the nature 
of the sanction or the rule upon which they relied to impose the sanction.1008 
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NATIVE LAW 
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Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Dale H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services  
In Dale H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,1009 the supreme 
court held a father’s parental rights can be terminated under ICWA when he has a history 
of abandonment and domestic violence.1010 Dale pled no contest to a fourth degree assault 
charge against a woman while she was pregnant.1011  After another incident involving the 
newborn, OCS petitioned the superior court to recognize the child as a “child in need of 
aid” under the ICWA.1012 The court found probable cause sufficient to award OCS 
temporary custody of the child and set forth a case plan for Dale that allowed him to 
pursue reunification subject to violence, parenting, and substance abuse counseling.1013 In 
the spring of 2009, OCS received three protective services reports involving domestic 
incidents between Dale and a new wife and stepson and subsequently moved to terminate 
Dale’s parental rights.1014 The superior court terminated Dale’s parental rights, and he 
appealed.1015 Citing prior precedent, the supreme court affirmed, stating that Dale’s one-
year abandonment of his child and his “propensity” for domestic violence made 
emotional and physical damage to the child if reunited “almost certain.”1016 The court 
reaffirmed that the “best interests” standard is related chiefly to the bonds developed 
between the child and his foster family, and found that the child was happy and 
thriving.1017  Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held a father’s parental rights 
can be terminated under ICWA when he has a history of abandonment and domestic 
violence.1018 
 
Lucy v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Lucy v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 1019 the supreme court 
held that to terminate parental rights under the Indian Child Welfare (ICWA) and Child 
in Need of Aid (CINA) statutes, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that 
the child has been exposed to conditions resulting in mental injury; that the parent failed 
to remedy unsuitable conduct; that active efforts were made to prevent the breakup of the 
family; that, as established by an expert witness, continued custody by the parent will 
result in damage to the child; and finally, that termination of parental rights is in the best 
interests of the child.1020 In October 2004, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took 
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custody of Jack and filed an Emergency Petition for Adjudication of Child in Need of 
Aid.1021 Lucy sought various forms of treatment for substance abuse until the fall of 2005, 
when she relapsed before the birth of her second child.1022 Over the next few years, her 
behavior included several incidences of child neglect, continual substance abuse, and 
refusal to seek treatment.1023 In 2006, the children were put in foster care.1024 She had a 
third child in 2007.1025 Her substance abuse and neglect continued, and in 2009, OCS 
terminated Lucy’s parental rights.1026 On appeal, the supreme court found that Lucy did 
not remedy her drug and alcohol abuse; that active efforts were made to prevent the break 
up of the family; and that terminating Lucy’s rights was in the children’s best 
interests.1027 Affirming the trial court, the supreme court held that to terminate parental 
rights under ICWA and CINA statutes, a court must find by clear and convincing 
evidence that the child has been exposed to conditions resulting in mental injury; that the 
parent failed to remedy unsuitable conduct; that active efforts were made to prevent the 
breakup of the family; that, as established by an expert witness, continued custody by the 
parent will result in damage to the child; and finally, that termination of parental rights is 
in the best interests of the child.1028 
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Alaska Supreme Court  
 
Dias v. State, Dep’t of Transportation and Public Facilities 
In Dias v. State, Dep’t of Transportation and Public Facilities,1029 the supreme 
court held that the state’s easement over private property unambiguously included a right 
of passage and the right to construct a road when the easement conveyed a “right of 
way.”1030 The state was conveyed an easement over the disputed property in 1969; in 
1992, the Diases were conveyed the land subject to the easement.1031 When the state 
attempted to negotiate future road construction along the encumbered land, the Diases 
filed suit to quiet title, claiming that the easement was solely for mineral removal, not for 
road construction.1032 The state moved for summary judgment and the superior court 
granted the motion, finding that the state’s right of way easement included road 
construction.1033 According to the definition of right of way and past supreme court 
decisions, the “right of passage” was unambiguously included in the state’s easement.1034  
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Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that the state’s easement over private 
property unambiguously included a right of passage and the right to construct a road 
when the easement conveyed a “right of way.”1035 
 
State, Department of Natural Resources v. Alaska Riverways, Inc.  
In State, Department of Natural Resources v. Alaska Riverways, Inc.,1036 the 
supreme court held that the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) had 
authority to mandate that commercial riparian landowners enter into leases for exclusive 
use of state-owned public trust shorelands but that rent amounts in such leases cannot be 
based on the number of passengers transported.1037 Alaska Riverways, a tour boat 
company, owned property along the Chena River.1038 Alaska Riverways and DNR tried 
and failed to agree on terms for a lease.1039 DNR later issued a final decision, stating that 
riparian owners “wharfing out” for commercial use had no natural property rights and 
that Alaska Riverways must enter into a lease for $1000 per year or $0.25 per paying 
customer, whichever was greater.1040 Alaska Riverways appealed, claiming both that the 
lease structure discriminated against commercial users and that the fee structure violated 
federal law.1041 Although the superior court held that DNR had no authority to bind 
Alaska Riverways to any lease, such a lease structure would not violate Alaska 
Riverways’ equal protection rights or federal law.1042 The supreme court held that the 
public trust doctrine does not itself require riparian owners to sign leases with the 
government but that the legislature had created such authority independently.1043 The 
court held that DNR was permitted to require Alaska Railways to sign a lease and that 
such a lease did not violate equal protection rights.1044 However, court held the $0.25 per 
passenger component of the lease agreement unconstitutional.1045 Federal law requires 
that states levy fees directly proportional to the benefit provided by the state.1046 Since the 
value of the state’s service was the same regardless of how many passengers boarded, the 
lease fee was set at $1000.1047 The supreme court held that DNR had the authority to bind 
riparian landowners to leases but that the choice of lease fees based on passenger counts 
violated federal law.1048   
 
Williams v. Fagnani 
 In Williams v. Fagnani,1049 the supreme court held that owners of servient estates 
may not maintain a gate obstructing the dominant owners’ implied easements unless the 
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benefit to the servient estate outweighs the inconveniences to the dominant estate.1050 The 
superior court held that Fagnani was entitled to maintain a locked gate that limited access 
to the roadway because the easement only provided for private use.1051 The supreme court 
reasoned that a locked gate imposes a significant burden on a homeowner’s right to 
access his or her property.1052 Therefore, locked gates would only be allowed where the 
locked gate provides a substantial benefit to the servient estate, such as providing 
security.1053 In situations where both benefit to the servient estate and detriment to the 
dominant estate are present, the two must be weighed against one another.1054 Vacating 
and remanding, the supreme court held that owners of servient estates may not maintain a 
gate obstructing the dominant owners’ implied easements unless the benefit to the 
servient estate outweighs the inconveniences to the dominant estate.1055 
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Alaska Supreme Court 
 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dooley 
 In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dooley,1056 the supreme court held that the tort of spoliation 
is not appropriate when evidence is concealed but not destroyed, and instead the newly 
recognized tort of fraudulent concealment of evidence is the proper cause of action.1057 
After a slip and fall trial, Dooley discovered that Allstate failed to produce a material 
piece of evidence and sued Allstate for spoliation of evidence and fraud and 
misrepresentation.1058 On partial summary judgment for the spoliation claim, the supreme 
court held that spoliation is not the proper tort when evidence is concealed but not 
destroyed.1059 Spoliation is a remedy if evidence is completely inaccessible and any 
damage calculation would be speculative, but evidence that is not destroyed can still be 
submitted to a fact-finder.1060 Instead, the proper claim should be under a newly 
recognized tort in Alaska, fraudulent concealment of evidence, which applies when: (1) 
the defendant concealed material evidence; (2) the plaintiff's cause of action was viable; 
(3) the evidence could not reasonably have been procured from another source; (4) the 
defendant concealed the evidence with the intent to disrupt or prevent litigation; (5) the 
withholding damaged the plaintiff from having to rely on an incomplete evidentiary 
record; and (6) the plaintiff had no available remedy when the evidence was 
discovered.1061 Remanding for further proceedings, the supreme court held that the tort of 
                                                 
1050 Id. at 75–76. 
1051 Id. 
1052 Id. at 75.  
1053 Id. 
1054 Id. at 76. 
1055 Id. at 75–76. 
1056 243 P.3d 197 (2010). 
1057 Id. at 203–04. 
1058 Id. at 198–199. 
1059 Id. at 199–200. 
1060 Id. at 203. 
1061 Id. at 204. 
 76
spoliation is not appropriate when evidence is concealed but not destroyed, and instead 
the tort of fraudulent concealment of evidence is the proper cause of action.1062 
 
Christoffersen v. State 
In Christoffersen v. State,1063 the supreme court held that court-appointed child 
custody investigators retain “absolute quasi-judicial immunity,” which also extends to the 
state, that shields them from civil lawsuits resulting from the performance of their 
duties.1064 A court-appointed investigator did not immediately notify the Christoffersens 
that their minor son had previously been accused of inappropriately touching a minor 
child.1065 After receiving the custody report that included the information about the 
inappropriate touching, the Christoffersens learned that the son had “sexually abused” 
their daughter and sued the state, claiming that the investigator failed in her duty to 
protect children from abuse and immediately report any sexual abuse that she 
discovered.1066 The superior court granted both of the state’s motions for summary 
judgment, holding that “custody investigators are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial 
immunity” from tort suits related to their official duties, and that the custody investigator 
in this case had no duty to warn the Christoffersens.1067 The supreme court affirmed the 
superior court’s disposition of the immunity issue without reaching the duty to warn.1068 
The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity extends to court-appointed experts and to 
others whose duties are “sufficiently related to the judicial process,” including custody 
investigators.1069 Finally, the court held that the state was not vicariously liable for these 
experts because “a government employee’s official immunity from suit bars vicarious 
liability claims against the government for the same conduct.”1070 Affirming the lower 
court, the supreme court held that court-appointed child custody investigators retain 
“absolute quasi-judicial immunity,” which also extends to the state, that shields them 
from civil lawsuits resulting from the performance of their duties.1071 
 
Lindsey v. E&E Automotive & Tire Service, Inc. 
In Lindsey v. E&E Automotive & Tire Service, Inc.,1072 the supreme court held 
that a plaintiff’s negligence claim against a mechanic does not withstand a motion for 
summary judgment when the mechanic fulfilled the duty to: (1) not “increase the risk of 
harm” during vehicle repairs; (2) not induce reliance on a vehicle that is unsafe; and (3) 
warn the vehicle owner of dangers the mechanic knows, or should have known, result 
from any unrepaired aspects of the vehicle.1073 Lindsey was injured when a truck rolled 
backwards over him due to a parking brake failure.1074 The truck had previously been 
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sent to E&E Automotive to repair its brakes.1075 The mechanic who worked on the truck 
did not know how to fix the parking brake and told the owner that it still did not work.1076 
Nonetheless, the owner put the truck back in service.1077 Lindsey sued E&E for 
negligence, and E&E moved for summary judgment.1078 The superior court found that a 
mechanic’s duty of care is to inform a vehicle owner that a vehicle is still impaired or that 
a repair has not been made.1079 Because it was not disputed that the mechanic told the 
owner that the brake still did not work, the court granted the motion for summary 
judgment.1080 On appeal, the supreme court found that E&E did not negligently make the 
truck more dangerous, did not induce the owner’s reliance on the truck, and did warn him 
that the truck was not repaired.1081 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that 
a plaintiff’s negligence claim against a mechanic does not withstand a motion for 
summary judgment when the mechanic fulfilled the duty to: (1) not “increase the risk of 
harm” during vehicle repairs; (2) not induce reliance on a vehicle that is unsafe; and (3) 
warn the vehicle owner of dangers the mechanic knows, or should have known, result 
from any unrepaired aspects of the vehicle.1082 
 
Mueller v. Buscemi  
In Mueller v. Buscemi,1083 the supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion when excluding evidence alleging (1) inadequate maintenance; (2) 
substantially similar events; and (3) habitual practice.1084 Mueller slipped on ice and hurt 
herself in Buscemi’s parking lot.1085 She sued Buscemi arguing that Buscemi’s failure to 
remove ice and provide lighting in the lot proximately caused Mueller’s injuries.1086 At 
trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Buscemi.1087 Mueller appealed, arguing that 
the trial court incorrectly excluded evidence.1088 The supreme court affirmed,1089 holding 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence of inadequate 
maintenance. Mueller failed to offer proof as to the substance of the evidence both during 
pretrial motions, and at trial.1090 Additionally, the supreme court reasoned that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion when excluding proffered evidence of substantially 
similar accidents because Mueller failed to overcome the burden of substantial 
similarity.1091 Finally, the supreme court reasoned that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when excluding evidence of habitual failed maintenance because the 
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photographs Mueller provided were not dated and were thus insufficient to support an 
inference of habit.1092 Affirming the trial court, the supreme court found the lower court 
did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence alleging (1) inadequate 
maintenance; (2) substantially similar events; and (3) habitual practice.1093 
 
Smith v. Radecki 
 In Smith v. Radecki,1094 the supreme court held that a physician performing an 
independent medical examination is not liable for medical malpractice because he does 
not have a physician-patient relationship with the examinee.1095 Smith injured his back 
and filed a workers’ compensation claim, prompting his employer to arrange for Radecki 
to conduct an independent medical examination.1096 Prior to the examination, Smith was 
informed that no physician-patient relationship would develop as a result of the 
examination.1097 Radecki did not discover several spinal injuries during this examination, 
causing Smith to file suit.1098 The superior court decided Radecki’s summary judgment 
motion in his favor and Smith appealed.1099 The supreme court reasoned that a physician 
that conducts an independent medical examination arranged by an employer does not owe 
the examinee the duty of care that accompanies a traditional physician-patient 
relationship.1100 The court also refused to extend a limited duty of care to Radecki’s 
actions because that limited duty was not implicated in Smith’s case.1101 Thus, the 
supreme court held that a physician performing an independent medical examination is 
not liable for medical malpractice because he does not have a physician-patient 
relationship with the examinee.1102 
 
Weed v. Bachner Co. Inc. 
In Weed v. Bachner Co. Inc.,1103 the supreme court held that state procurement 
officials are only entitled to qualified immunity when defending against common law 
claims arising out of bid evaluation processes.1104  Bachner was not awarded a state 
contract and sued the procurement officials as individuals, alleging that they had 
intentionally interfered with Bachner’s prospective economic opportunity.1105  The 
officials moved to dismiss the claim on the basis of absolute immunity.1106 The superior 
court denied the motion and held that the procurement officials only had qualified 
immunity.1107  The supreme court affirmed, applying a three factor test.1108   The first 
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factor, the nature and importance of the officials’ function to the administration of 
government, weighed in favor of qualified immunity.1109  The second factor, the 
likelihood that the officials will face frequent litigation and the difficulty of defending 
themselves, also weighed in favor of qualified immunity.1110  The final factor, the 
availability of alternative remedies to the bidders, weighed in favor of absolute 
immunity.1111  The supreme court affirmed the superior court and held that state 
procurement officials are only entitled to qualified immunity when defending against 
common law claims arising out of the bid evaluation process.1112 
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Farmer v. Farmer 
 In Farmer v. Farmer,1113 the supreme court held that the superior court did not 
abuse its discretion by appointing a temporary limited conservator for a person who 
demonstrated an inability to manage his property and finances.1114 A probate master 
found Robert Farmer was “incapacitated” because he could not manage his finances and 
appointed his daughter Barbara as partial limited conservator.1115 The superior court 
conducted a hearing de novo and approved the probate master’s findings.1116 Robert 
appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a conservator 
appointment.1117 Applying a clearly erroneous standard of review, the supreme court held 
that the superior court’s factual findings supported the conclusion that Robert was unable 
to manage his property and affairs.1118 The supreme court noted that “incapacity” 
necessitating a conservator, under § 13.26.165(2)(A) of the Alaska Statutes, is different 
from “incapacity” necessitating guardianship; establishing “incapacity” necessitating a 
conservator focuses on the individual’s ability to manage his property and affairs.1119 The 
superior court found that Robert was unable to prioritize his finances.1120 The supreme 
court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a temporary 
limited conservator for a person who demonstrated an inability to manage his property 
and finances.1121 
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